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Summary
The thesis consists of an introduction followed by three numbered chapters (independent
papers). It covers topics in international trade, and in di¤erent ways the thesis investigates
aspects of heterogeneity. The rst chapter is coauthored with Pascalis Raimondos-Møller. The
version of this chapter is published in the CESifo Working Paper Series and serves as the
nal background paper for the compressed journal article published in Review of Development
Economics, May 2012. The second chapter is coauthored with Madhura Maitra, senior PhD
student at Columbia University at the time. The third chapter is a solo paper.
In the rst chapter we introduce a traditional macro model of trade and change the com-
petitive environment by introducing state-owned enterprises. We also include heterogenous
households to analyze e¤ects on the income distribution. The chapter focuses on Vietnams
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2007. Upon entry, Vietnam was granted
an accession period lasting till 2014. During this period tari¤s would have to fall according
to the accession agreement. This rst chapter evaluates this 2007-2014 trade liberalization by
building an applied general equilibrium model and calibrating it to the Vietnamese data. The
model pays careful attention to the fact that Vietnam has many state-owned enterprises that
do not behave in a prot maximizing way. The model simulations show that the WTO imposed
tari¤ reforms will reduce the overall welfare level of the Vietnamese households. Moreover, the
biggest loss of income will take place among the poor rural households in Vietnam. We propose
other tari¤ reforms that both raise overall welfare and reduce income inequality.
In the second chapter we analyze wage e¤ects from o¤shoring using the Danish worker-
rm panel of the universe of Danish rms and workers. We limit the main analysis, however, to
manufacturing rms. Our motivating point of departure is that o¤shoring rms are found to pay
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higher average wages than purely domestic rms. In this chapter we o¤er a unifying empirical
approach by capturing the di¤erent channels through which o¤shoring may explain this wage
di¤erence: (i) due to change in the composition of workers (skill composition e¤ect), and (ii)
because all existing workers get higher pay (rent sharing e¤ect). Using Danish worker-rm data
we explain how much each channel contributes to higher wages.
To estimate the causal e¤ect of o¤shoring on wages we use Chinas accession to the WTO in
December 2001 and the soon after boom in Chinese exports  as positive exogenous shocks to
the incentive to o¤shore to China. Both skill composition and rent sharing e¤ects are found to
be important in explaining the resultant gain in wages. We also show that the rms timing in
the o¤shoring process determines the relative importance of a channel. For rms o¤shoring to
China in 2002 but not in 1999, only rent sharing explains the gain in wages. For rms o¤shoring
to China both before and after Chinas WTO accession the wage increase is explained mostly by
the skill composition e¤ect. Moreover, these patterns are not discernible from the measures of
skill composition and rent sharing available in typical rm level datasets like ratio of educated
to uneducated workers and sales per employee.
In the third chapter I utilize unique data on rm level monthly trade featuring product
and destination information. I use these data to analyze the extent of pricing-to-market among
Danish exporters. The topic revolves around a very particular challenge that exporters face: to
price their exports in a foreign market when the exchange rate changes. As opposed to annual
trade ows, monthly trade ows bring us closer to the transaction level where rm decisions
are actually made. Furthermore, they provide more precise measures of prices than aggregate,
annual data do. I nd that the utilization of monthly data does add new information about
the average level of pricing-to-market, and the di¤erences between long-run pricing-to-market
and short-run pricing-to-market. Furthermore, I nd industry di¤erences in pricing-to-market
vin terms of the magnitude (zero to complete pricing-to-market) and the timing (when do rms
changes prices), and that pricing-to-market is stronger on high-income markets. As discussed in
detail in the chapter, all results are in-line with predictions of several theoretical contributions
to the literature on pricing-to-market and exchange rate pass-through.
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Dansk resume
Afhandlingen består af en indledning efterfulgt af tre nummererede kapitler, som hver især
udgør selvstændige papirer. Fælles for alle kapitler er, at de relaterer til emner inden for forskn-
ing i international handel og berører forskellige former for heterogenitet. Endvidere er de alle
kvantitative studier, hvor der enten bruges simulationsmetoder eller udføres økonometriske esti-
mationer. Det første kapitel er forfattet sammen med Pascalis Raimondos-Møller. Denne version
af kapitlet er publiceret i CESifo Working Paper Series og er det endelige baggrundspapir for
den mere kompakte artikel publiceret i Review of Devolopment Economics, maj 2012. Det andet
kapitel er forfattet sammen med Madhura Maitra, phd-studerende ved Columbia University på
det pågældende tidspunkt. Det tredje kapitel er selvforfattet.
I første kapitel introducerer vi en traditionel makroøkonomisk handelsmodel og ændrer den
konkurrencemæssige form ved særskilt at modellere statsejede virksomheder anderledes end
privatejede. Vi modellerer også heterogene husholdninger for at kunne belyse e¤ekter på in-
dkomstfordelingen. Kapitlet fokuserer på Vietnams indtræden i verdenshandelsorganisationen
(WTO) i 2007. Ved indtræden k Vietnam frem til 2014 til at fuldføre processen. I perio-
den fra 2007-2014 skulle toldsatser så sænkes i henhold til gældende aftale. Vi evaluerer denne
handelsliberalisering ved at opstille en anvendt generel ligevægtsmodel og kalibrere den til viet-
namesiske data. Vi er i modellen særligt opmærksomme på de statsejede virksomheder, som
den vietnamesiske økonomi er stærkt afhængig af, og som ikke har incitamenter til at udvise
optimerende adfærd og dermed protmaksimere. Simulationerne viser, at isoleret set så giver
den forslåede toldreform ikke udsigter til velfærdsforbedringer. Særligt vil de store tabere være
den fattige landbefolkning. Vi foreslår andre reformer, som generelt kan hæve den økonomiske
levestandard og også sænke uligheden.
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I det andet kapitel analyserer vi løne¤ekter af outsourcing til udlandet. Vi benytter Dan-
marks Statistiks registerdata over samtlige arbejdere på det danske arbejdsmarked og de virk-
somheder, de arbejder i. Vi begrænser dog vores hovedstudie til fremstillingssektoren. Vores
motivation stammer fra det veletablerede faktum, at virksomheder, som outsourcer produktion
til udlandet, i gennemsnit betaler højere lønninger end virksomheder, som ikke outsourcer pro-
duktion til udlandet. I dette kapitel viser vi, hvorledes man empirisk kan analysere forskellige,
samtidige årsager til disse lønforskelle. De mulige samtidige årsager til ændringer i virksomhed-
ernes gennemsnitslønninger, som vi analyserer, er (i) ændringer til kompetencesammensætningen
og (ii) stigende protabilitet, som øger alle lønninger. Den sidste årsag, eller e¤ekt, benævnes
rent sharing i litteraturen. Den første e¤ekt benævnes skill composition.
For at skelne kausalitet fra korrelation anvender vi Kinas indtræden i WTO ultimo 2001
som et eksogent stød til incitamentet til at outsource produktion til Kina. Vi nder, at efter-
følgende lønstigninger bunder i både skill composition- og rent sharing-e¤ekter. Vi nder også,
at e¤ekternes relevans varierer for den enkelte virksomhed. Virksomheder, der allerede kendte
til outsourcing af produktionen til Kina, var skill compostion-e¤ekten den vigtigste forklar-
ing. For virksomheder, der ikke tidligere havde outsourcet til Kina, var rent sharing-e¤ekten
udelukkende den forklarende årsag. Endvidere dokumenterer vi, hvorledes udnyttelsen af indi-
viddata inden for hver virksomhed, gør os i stand til at måle disse e¤ekter, som man ikke ville
kunne have målt ved udelukkende at anvende de mål, man typiske har til rådighed i et detaljeret
virksomhedspanel, men som ikke indeholder persondata.
I det tredje kapitel udnytter jeg unikke, månedlige data, som beskriver danske virksomhed-
ers handel med udlandet på detaljeret produkt- og destinationsniveau. Jeg benytter disse data
til at analysere danske eksportørers aggeren på udenlandske markeder i forhold til at tilpasse
eksportprisen til gældende markedsvilkår. I litteraturen kaldes dette pricing-to-market. Nært
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beslægtet er litteraturen om exchange rate pass-through, som beskæftiger sig med udslaget i im-
portpriser, når valutakursen ændrer sig. Pricing-to-market berører den helt særlige udfordring,
som eksportvirksomheder står over for, nemlig at prisfastsætte deres produkter på et udenlandsk
marked, når valutakursen ændrer sig. Når kronen stiger i værdi, så bør en eksportvirksomhed
alt-andet-lige sænke eksportprisen for at forblive konkurrencedygtig på det udenlandske marked,
da prisen her ellers vil stige med kronen. Jeg undersøger, hvor stor priselasticiteten er i forhold
til valutakursændringer, og om størrelsen på elasticiteten afhænger af virksomhedens position
på det udenlandske marked.
Modsat årlige data, så giver månedlige data os muligheden for at komme tæt på transaktion-
sniveauet, hvor virksomhedernes beslutninger faktisk tages. Vi opnår samtidig et mere præcist
mål for priserne, end tilfældet er det med aggregerede årlige data. Studiet viser, at anvendelsen
af månedsdata har fordele over årsdata og bidrager til litteraturen om omfanget af pricing-to-
market samt forskelle mellem kortsigtede og langsigtede pricing-to-market-beslutninger. End-
videre nder jeg forskelle mellem fremstillingssektorerne både i forhold til omfanget (fra ingen
til fuld reaktion) og i forhold til reaktionstidspunktet, og så nder jeg, at pricing-to-market er
mere udtalt på højindkomstmarkeder. Som det også uddybes i kapitlet, så understøtter resul-
taterne adskillige teoretiske bidrag indenfor litteraturen om pricing-to-market og exchange rate
pass-through.
1Introduction
The thesis covers topics in international trade that in di¤erent ways investigates aspects of
heterogeneity. Identical for all three chapters is, that they are quantitative studies, either using
computable simulations techniques or performing econometric estimations. The rst chapter
explores heterogeneity in a di¤erent way than the last two chapters, as it employs non-traditional
methods in an otherwise classical, theoretical model. The international trade literature has
focussed heavily on the heterogeneity of rms to explain the selection of exporters and importers
(see Melitz, 2003, and Bernard, Jensen & Schott, 2007). The focus on rm heterogeneity
and simultaneously the availability of rm-level data has given scholars great opportunities
to investigate theoretical predictions while taking into account the unique behavior of every rm
in the sample data. We say that we control for rm heterogeneity. Furthermore the availability
of worker-rm panels has opened up for measuring not just rm e¤ects but within-rm e¤ects.
Chapters 2 uses the unique Danish worker-rm panel but, while chapter 3 utilizes unique and
new data on monthly rm level trade.
The rst chapter can viewed as a comment on the use of quantitative measures of e¤ects
from liberalizing trade. The policy implications should raise concern about the theoretical
foundation on which trade policy makers are often advised. Often models used to evaluate
trade liberalization are neoclassical macro models of trade. In this chapter, coauthored with
Pascalis Raimondos-Møller, we alternate a standard trade model (Ricardo-Viner) to include
state-owned enterprises that are not prot maximizing but instead labor (and thus revenue and
size) maximizing. We include heterogenous, representative households.
We then calibrate this model to the reality Vietnam was facing when entering the World
Trade Organization (WTO) in 2007. We then simulate and evaluate the proposed liberalization
(i.e. the move from the bound rates upon entering to the nal rates by 2014) to demonstrate
2that the settled liberalization (close to proportional cuts) does not improve welfare. We then
evaluate traditional methods used to cut tari¤s that in a perfectly competitive model is guar-
anteed to generate welfare improvements. However, these measures also fail when the proposed
state-owned enterprise behavior is introduced. In fact, we show that subsidizing competitive
imports to discipline state-owned enterprises generates massive gains. Furthermore, contrary to
common arguments of trade as a poverty alleviator, we nd that the population hurt the most
by the proposed tari¤ cuts is the labor intensive agricultural sector that employs especially the
poor rural population (i.e. the poorest of the poor). These ndings are new to the trade and de-
velopment literature and o¤er new views in an otherwise well-known discussion: is it appropriate
to use competitive macro models to evaluate macro policies for developing countries?
The second chapter, coauthored with Madhura Maitra, investigates o¤shoring behavior of
Danish rms using the unique Danish panel of the universe of rms registered in Denmark.
We investigate the well-known question of why o¤shoring rms pay higher average wages. We
provide a theoretical motivation, and an identication strategy that suggests the direction of
causality to demonstrate that Danish rms that took up a new o¤shoring possibility (our treat-
ment group) experienced positive di¤erential wage increases compared to the control group.
We focus on manufacturing rms, but our results also hold for the full sample of rms.
We o¤er a unifying empirical approach to disintangle two possible channels behind the higher
average wage changes among o¤shoring rms: a rent sharing channel and a skill composition
channel. So far in the literature, these channels have been explored separately. We carry out the
analysis in two ways. First estimate we carry out estimations using only rm-level evidence and
demonstrate that rent sharing e¤ects are not discernible from typical rm-level panels. Then we
utilize the worker-rm panel to construct a rent-sharing component in workerswages between
the worker and the rm. We then use this aggregate component of worker-rm rent sharing
3at the rm level and nd evidence of rent sharing. We then go on to show that rm average
wages increase through the two channels in di¤erent ways depending on the timing of o¤shoring
to China. Firms that o¤shored to China before China entered WTO, seem to predominantly
change average wages by trimming the workforce. However, rms new to o¤shoring to China
experience wage increases completely through rent sharing, suggesting that these rms harvest
low hanging fruits of cost improvement.
We utilize Chinas entry into the WTO as an exogenous shock to the incentive to o¤shore.
Since we started writing this chapter, this identication strategy has become increasingly used
and recognized. Our ndings, the application of the econometric methods, and the identication
strategy are novel to the literature.
The policy conclusions are that the concern that low-skill jobs are threatened is, once again,
conrmed. Other studies show that workers experiencing job separation from o¤shoring enter
lower wage paths. However, we show that workers that stay in the rms enter higher wage
paths and thus benet from rms o¤shoring. What policy makers should take from this study
is that the di¤erential wage increase is far from just a story of cost cutting by changing the skill
composition. In some cases the story could be completely driven by increased protability.
The third chapter follows a recent strand of literature that data re-investigates exchange
rate pass-through and pricing-to-market. This study is novel in three ways: First, It uses
high-frequent, detailed rm-level export data where other studies have used less frequent data.
Second, it explores short-run and long-run pricing-to-market at the rm level which no other
study has done. Third, it furthermore explores short-run and long-run aspects within industries
and country types.
The discussion of PTM relates to the long-standing literature on incomplete exchange rate
pass-through that is concerned with why import prices do not fully adjust to exchange rate
4changes. This chapter takes on PTM using a unique data set that covers rm level trade at
great detail at monthly frequency. These high frequent data o¤er the opportunity of a new view
on what hides behind the time-aggregate estimates typically found using annual data. Annual
trade ows are the sum of multiple decisions taken at di¤erent points in time. By moving to
monthly trade ows we get closer to the transaction level where rm decisions are actually made.
To see the benet of that, note that annual data provide annual unit values  called prices in
this literature. By being annual data, these prices are averages over the di¤erent prices the
rm has charged during that year. Using monthly data, and thus monthly unit values, we can
be almost sure that unit values are indeed close to the price specied in a particular export
contract.
I nd that the utilization of monthly data does add new information about average PTM,
and the di¤erences between long-run pricing-to-market and short-run pricing-to-market. Fur-
thermore, I nd industry di¤erences in terms of the magnitude and the timing of pricing-to-
market, and that pricing-to-market is particularly strong on high-income markets. As discussed
in detail in the chapter, these results are in-line with theoretical predictions of choice of invoice
currency and the associated pricing mechanism.
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Reducing tari¤s according to WTO accession rules:
the case of Vietnam
by
Henrik Barslund Fosse & Pascalis Raimondos-Møller
Abstract: When Vietnam entered WTO in 2007 it was granted an accession period up to
2014. During this period tari¤s would have to fall according to the accession agreement. This
paper evaluates this 2007-2014 trade liberalization by building an applied general equilibrium
model and calibrating it to the Vietnamese data. The model pays careful attention to the fact
that Vietnam has many state-owned enterprises that do not behave in a prot maximizing way.
The model simulations show that the WTO imposed tari¤ reforms will reduce the overall welfare
level of the Vietnamese households. Moreover, the biggest loss of income will take place among
the poor rural households in Vietnam. We propose other tari¤ reforms that both raise overall
welfare and reduce income inequality.
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61. Introduction
On January 11, 2007, and after 12 years of accession process, Vietnam became the 150th member
of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Becoming a member of the WTO ultimately implies
a binding tari¤ schedule. The Vietnamese accession process will be formally completed when a
gradual reduction of the existing tari¤ rates reach the pre-determined nal rates. This will be
the case in 2014.
The present paper evaluates this accession-led trade liberalization using a computable general
equilibrium (CGE) model calibrated to the Vietnamese economy. In doing that, special attention
is paid to the existence of state-owned enterprises and how they a¤ect the economy by large.
Moreover, we pay attention to income distribution issues among heterogeneous households and
we investigate how di¤erent trade liberalization schemes a¤ect this distribution. While linking
trade liberalization to income distribution is not by itself novel, doing that in the presence of
state-owned enterprises and for a calibrated model of the Vietnamese WTO accession is, to the
best of our knowledge, novel to the literature.1
In modelling state-owned enterprises we follow the approach adopted in several writings
about state-owned enterprises in general, viz. that they do not maximize prots (see Schmitz.,
J., 1996; and World Bank, 2005). More in particular, we follow Whalley and Zhang (2006)
who assume that state-owned enterprises maximize revenues. With prices being xed by the
world market (small open economy) this assumption implies that state-owned enterprises in
reality maximize output and thus employment. As we will show, introducing such a state-
owned enterprise behavior in an otherwise standard trade model of a small open economy alters
considerably the welfare e¤ects of di¤erent tari¤ reforms.
We will show that if the state-owned enterprises behaved as prot maximizers, the WTO
accession tari¤ reforms would both increase aggregate real income and reduce income inequality
 clearly, a win-win situation. However, with state-owned enterprises maximizing revenues,
the WTO accession tari¤ reforms will end up doing exactly the opposite, viz. reduce aggregate
income and increase income inequality. The same will be true for other well-known reform rules
 the concertina rule (where the highest tari¤ is reduced to the second highest level) and the
proportional rule (where all tari¤ rates are reduced by the same proportion). In other words,
1See Abbott et al. (2009) for a survey of this literature using Vietnam as the case of study. Similar to
our paper, Ghosh and Whalley (2008) focus on Vietnam and trade liberalization under state-owned enterprices.
However, both the model and the experiments they consider are quite di¤erent from ours (they apply a shirking
model of state-owned enterprises that they use to analyze the case of zero tari¤s).
7all the well-known tari¤ reduction rules bound to fail when state-owned enterprises distort the
market economy.
Given this distorting behavior of state-owned enterprises, one may want to know what kind of
tari¤ reform would achieve the goals of higher real income and lower income inequality. We show
that the main characteristic of this reform has to be a large and disproportionate reduction of
the protection of the state-owned sector  in fact, we will show that if the imports of the goods
produced by the state-owned enterprises are subsidized, both welfare and income distribution
will improve. We will provide intuition for this and all other results after we explain what state-
owned enterprises imply to the market equilibrium. Firstly, however, and in order to set the
background for our model choices, we provide a brief description of the Vietnamese economy
and the signicance of the state-owned enterprises in that economy.
1.1. Vietnam. Vietnam is a country in change. It is turning global in many aspects 
culturally, socially, and economically. Table 1 shows the change of the overall structure of the
Vietnamese economy in the period 1990-2006, with manufacturing clearly increasing its GDP
value added at the cost of the primary sector.
Year Agriculture, forestry Industry and Service
and shing construction
1990 39 23 39
2006 20 42 38
Source: General Statistics O¢ ce of Vietnam
Table 1: Decomposition of GDP in Vietnam (pct.)
However, while industrialization has made manufacturing and services the predominant
providers of value added, the income source of the majority of the Vietnamese population is
still the primary sector. As of 2006, more than 58 % of the population were employed within
these industries (see table 2).
Since the majority of the population, and especially of the lower-income households, is em-
ployed in the labour-intensive primary sector, this sector is of special consideration. That the
poor people work in the rural areas is supported by looking at the urban-rural 0.37 Gini coef-
cient, implying that wealth distribution is skewed moderately towards urban Vietnam. Com-
bined with a 0.28 Gini coe¢ cient of rural Vietnam, this points towards a generally low, but
even, rural per capita income level. Clearly, and as one would expect from a socialist country,
the overall income inequality in Vietnam is relatively low  a 0.3 value places Vietnam between
8Employment by kind of economic activity, pct. (2006)
Agriculture and forestry 55.4
Fishing 3.4
Industry 12.7
Construction 4.6
Trade 11.5
Hotel, restaurant 1.8
Transport, storage and communications 2.9
Culture, health and education 4.0
Other services 3.7
UNDP Poverty Line (2002), pct. 29.0
UNDP Food Poverty Line (2002), pct. 10.9
UNDP Urban/Rural Gini coe¢ cient 0.37
Urban 0.35
Rural 0.28
Source: General Statistics O¢ ce of Vietnam
Table 2: Employment, Poverty and Income Distribution
the Scandinavian countries (0.26) and the USA (0.408), and close to countries such as France,
Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom. But Vietnam is a low income developing country.
A growth in income inequality may be devastating for many Vietnamese families if the source
of this growth is lower income at the bottom end of the income scale. According to the United
Nations Development Programme in Vietnam, even though absolute poverty has been reduced
considerably throughout the 90s, 29% of the population were still living below the poverty line
in 2002 (UNDP VN, 2002). In rough numbers that is more than 23 million people in a country
with more than 80 million inhabitants.
Focusing on the importance of state-owned enterprises it should be mentioned that from
1995 to 2006, state ownership of production facilities has decreased from 50% to 38%, house-
hold ownership of production facilities has decreased from 36% to 30%, while foreign investment
ownership of production has increased from 6% to 17%. Moreover, this state production is very
much focused in the industrial sector; in 2006, 75% of the state output was industrial output.
Such predominance of state-owned rms can be explained by what the literature calls a Guanxi
approach (Ashwill and Diep, 2005)  typically assumed for Chinese state-owned rms. Viet-
namese culture exhibits  along with pervasive corruption  a system of relationship building
similar to the Guanxi system in China. In such a system, a politically appointed management
may build up prestige by securing many jobs for the locals in the local community. More im-
portantly to the management, by managing a large enterprise it may increase its proceeds from
9networking with other managers (under the assumption that the larger the rm you manage,
the more important people you will network with). The management may also experience pro-
ceeds from networking with inuential party members who politically motivated  directly or
indirectly  facilitate a subsidy to the rm. Hence, by maximizing employment and size of the
rm, the manager is assumed to maximize personal utility.
One of the focal points of the state-owned enterprise reform in Vietnam has been to reduce
the number of typically small local government controlled rms (UNDP VN, 2006; Sjöholm,
2006). The local governed state-owned rms have been singled out as a way of channeling state
resources to other purposes than intended. Equitization is conceived as the way of restructuring
state-owned rms. By creating publicly listed rms, where the government may own only
some shares, the government wants to make the state-owned enterprises partly dependent on
competitive capital funding. In general, however, the high national dependency on state output
seems to slow down the privatization process. Large SOEs seem so far to have been exempted
from equitization. Moreover, the evidence of major sourcing of equities to non-governmental
stakeholders has yet to be seen. The General Statistics O¢ ce of Vietnam (GSO) provides data
for how many people are employed in state-owned production facilities, how many state-owned
rms exist, but not how much they produce, what prots are, and e.g. which state rms are
equitized and what governs the principle of foreign investments in these rms.2
On the basis of the above facts, we build a model where state-owned enterprises are explicitly
taken into account within an otherwise traditional general equilibrium model of the Vietnamese
economy. We also pay careful attention to heterogenous households and their source of income.
In what follows, we describe in detail the model chosen.
2. The Model
2.1. Production. We model a specic-factor small open economy. There are four represen-
tative producers of four nal goods in the economy: A competitive primary producer, yP , a
competitive (private) light manufacturer, yl, a manufacturing state-owned enterprise, ysoe, and
a rest-of-economy sector, yroe.
2Moreover, even if one observes private share owners, these may in turn owned by a public agent. This is an
often cited problem in the literature on assessments of Chinese state-ownership of publicly as well as (seemingly)
privately held (o¤-listed) companies. As pointed out by Whalley and Zhang (2006) one example is Lenovo. The
company is formally owned by Legend Holdings. However, Legend Holding is controlled by the Chinese Academy
of Natural Sciences.
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The production functions applied in the model are Cobb-Douglas:
yj = AjF
1 j
j L
j
j = 'jL
j
j ; j = p; l; soe; roe (1)
where Fj is the specic factor of the respective sectors, and thus 'j = AjF
1 j
j is just a scalar.
Three of the sectors have identical structures but di¤erent inputs to production. In the
primary sector, yp, the single immobile factor is land, while in the two other competitive sectors
the immobile factor is sector-specic capital. Prot maximization under perfect competition
yields the traditional result that labour is paid its marginal product value. Moreover, zero
prots are achieved. The immobile factor is paid a residual rent. That is,
Rj = pjyj   wLj = pjyj   pj @yj
@Lj
Lj = pjLj

yj
Lj
  @yj
@Lj

= pjLj (APLj  MPLj) > 0 ; Lj > 0; j = p; l; roe (2)
The fourth sector, the state-owned enterprises, behaves di¤erently. By assuming that the
management of the state-owned rms seeks to maximize the size of the enterprise and not its
prots, it hires as many workers as possible. Hence, state capital is considered allocated free of
cost from the perspective of the state-owned rm. The problem of the rm simply is to maximize
revenues subject to the wage bill, which implies hiring labour at a nominal wage rate equal to
the value average product of labour, w = psoe APLsoe , instead of the value marginal product of
labour, psoe MPLsoe , as is the case in the rest of the economy. Since MPLL < 0, APL > MPL
for any L > 0: As is the case in the competitive part of the economy, the residual rents of the
SOE go to the immobile factor: state allocated capital. However, since capital is allocated free
of cost, the rents accrued by the government are e¤ectively zero.3
2.2. Households. The model considers three households. Two lower-income households in
rural and urban areas, h1and h2 respectively, and a higher-income household, h3, found both in
the rural and urban areas. Household preferences for the goods consumed are represented by
3 It is this zero-capital rent property of SOEs that motivates our choice of a specic-factor model. If we
considered a Hecksher-Ohlin model with intersectoral mobility of all factors, then the zero cost of capital would
extend to all sectors  clealry, an undesirable property within a general equilibrium model (it would be equivalent
to having only labour as factor of production). Ghosh and Whalley (2008) consider also a specic-factor model
of the Vietnamese economy.
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CES utility functions
Ui = Ui(xi;j) =
0@X
j
i;jx
i 1
i
i;j
1A
i
i 1
; i = 1; 2; 3; j = p;m; l; soe (3)
where " is the elasticity of substitution,4 and  denotes the share parameter that determines
demand patterns of the households.
The income of each of the households is given by
Ii =
X
j
 
i;jwLj

+
X
j 6=soe
(i;jRj) + iG; i = 1; 2; 3 and j = p; l; soe; roe (4)
where i;j are household shares of labour income (with
P
i
P
j i;j = 1), and i;j are the residual
rents from immobile factors (with
P
i
P
j 6=soe i;j = 1). Using  and , the modeler assigns prop-
erty rights of the total economy factor endowments to the households. G denotes total transfers
to/from the government. These are described in detail when introducing the government below.
i denotes household share of G where
P
i i = 1.
Welfare maximization subject to the income equal expenditure constraint leads to the fol-
lowing demand functions
xi;j = 
i
i;j

pi
Pi
 i Ii
Pi
; i = 1; 2; 3 and j = p;m; l; soe (5)
where Pi =
P
j 
i
ijp
1 i
j
 1
1 i is the subjective CES price index.
2.3. Government. Given our small open economy assumption, world prices are kept xed.
By setting tari¤s at an arbitrary level the government has full control over the domestic prices.
Assuming ad valorem tari¤ rates, the domestic prices (p) are given by world prices (pw) times
the mark-up (1 + t), where t is the percentage tax rate on imports, i.e.
pj = p
w
j (1 + tj) (6)
The government solely focuses on managing a balanced budget. Hence, it is simply repre-
4For our calculations we set this elasticity at 0.8. Other values (i.e. 0.6 and 0.9) have been used without any
change to our qualitative results.
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sented by a budget constraint
G = T =
X
j
tjp
w
j zj +Rsoe (7)
where G is government expenditure, T is revenues from trade taxes and rents accrued from
state-owned enterprise capital (which, as discussed above, is zero if SOE maximize revenues),
and zj being imports dened as excess demand (zj =
P
i xi;j   yj). The actions available to
balance the budget are simple lump-sum taxes, i.e. either collecting a lump sum tax from the
households in case of a budget decit, or distributing a lump sum tax to the consumers in case
of a budget surplus.
Finally, full employment and balanced trade conditions are imposed to clear the labour and
goods markets, respectively.
Before moving to the calibration of the model using data from Vietnam, we should emphasize
the importance of having state-owned enterprises (SOE) in the model. We showed that under
the assumption that SOEs maximize revenues, a SOE will hire labour at a wage equal to the
value of the average product instead of the value of the marginal product of labour. The SOE
will thus demand more labour than is economically e¢ cient. This higher demand will drive up
the (nominal) wage and lower the potential output of the rest of the economy. In this situation,
a tari¤ on SOE produced goods will aggravate the distortion SOEs create, as it will even further
move recourses towards the state-owned sector. Reducing tari¤s is naturally a correct response
to this. However, as the theory of the second-best tells us, not any tari¤ reduction will work.
That is exactly the purpose of building an applied general equilibrium and calibrating to the
Vietnamese data.
3. Case Study: The Vietnamese Accession to the WTO
Using Vietnams WTO accession as a case, we proceed by calibrating the model to the data.
To do that, we need to aggregate the existing data into 3 type of households and 4 type of
production sectors. Starting from production, functions are calibrated on the basis of the value
added shares of each of the four sectors in the model. Consumer demands are then preset
residually to match trade patterns of the Vietnamese economy. A top down split of GDP shares
is shown in table 3.
The primary production sector, yp, includes the activities agriculture, forestry and shing
which sum to 21:8% of GDP. The factor allocation in the primary sector implies a 80.7% labour
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Non- Private State
Total primary Primary Rest of manufac- manufac-
economy sectors sector economy turing turing
Year 2004 (p ,l,ro e,so e) (l,ro e,so e) (p) (ro e) (l) (so e)
Labour 70:3 67:4 80:7 48:2 48:2 100
Capital 25:5 32:6   51:8 52:8  
Land 4:2   19:3      
GDP shares 100 78:2 21:8 38:0 11:3 28:9
Source: Nielsen (2002), General Statistics O¢ ce of Vietnam, IMF WEO,
Penn World Table, and own calculations
Table 3: Model benchmark: Sectoral GDP shares and factor allocation
value added share and a 19:3% land value added share. Aggregate capital formation constitutes
25:5% of GDP. Capital is allocated in the manufacturing and service industries and comprise
32:6% of non-primary production value added. These are split on the two private sectors, yl and
yroe, since the assumption of un-priced capital in state-owned enterprises implies that labour
value added makes up a 100% of total factor value added going into SOE production, ysoe.
Recall that the value of 'j is a product of F
1 
j and an unobservable sector specic tech-
nology scale parameter, Aj . Given the Ricardo-Viner structure of the model, calibration of the
parameters 'i and i su¢ ces. The calibrated values are shown in table 4.
p roe l soe
j 0:81 0:48 0:48 0:30
'j 1:68 8:24 4:41 8:83
Source: WTO, Comtrade and own calculations
Table 4: Supply side parameters in the Vietnam Model
Moving into the demand side of the economy, we need to match the Vietnamese reality
described in the introductory section and thus consider three heterogenous households: the
lower income rural population, h1, the lower income urban population, h2, and the higher
income population, h3, found in urban as well as rural Vietnam.
The key to distribute factor income among the three households stems from Nielsens (2002)
social accountancy matrix (SAM) found most suitable for the purpose of this analysis. From
this SAM, a small sub-matrix is extracted and simplied.
The point of departure for creating the postulated income distribution is an assignment
of rights of access to the factor endowments. As mentioned previously, income inequality in
Vietnam is no higher than in a typical European economy. In general, inequality is low but there
is an above average inequality between rural and urban Vietnam and within urban Vietnam,
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while in the rural areas the average Vietnamese citizen tends to be poorer and facing almost
no inequality. This view has spurred an assignment of rights of access to income accrued from
unskilled, medium skilled, and skilled types of labour used in Nielsen (2002), and from land and
capital. In doing that, we note that while general education in Vietnam is not high compared to
developed economies, the majority of the population has a standard elementary school education
and literacy levels are above 90% for both genders (UNESCO). This has led to the assumption
that the lower income households receive income both from paid unskilled jobs and from (medium
skill) self-employment. The lower income rural household receives 15% of land rents whereas the
majority of land rents are received by the higher income household. The resulting calculations
are presented in table 5.
Agri. Non-agri. Paid Total
self-empl. self-empl. labour Land Capital income
earnings earnings earnings share*
Lower income rural household 86:6 36:8 35:5 15:0 34:8
Lower income urban household 6:3 46:6 25:7 18:8
Higher income household 7:1 16:7 38:7 85:0 100 46:4
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Nielsen (2002), GSO, IMF WEO, Penn World World Table, and own calculations
*This is the benchmark distribution in the applied model
Table 5: Sectoral income distribution in the Vietnam Model, per cent
On the basis of this income distribution, population shares are assigned5 and per capita
income measures are calculated. The results are presented in table 6.
Pct. Mill. Bill. Dongs Bill. USD ThousandDongs USD
Thousand
Dongs USD
USD PPP
corrected1
Lower income rural
population 58.0 47.3 248,855 15.9 5,259 336.1 14.41 0.92 4.64
Lower income urban
population 20.0 16.3 134,477 8.6 8,241 526.8 22.58 1.44 7.27
Higher income population 22.0 17.9 331,974 21.2 18,494 1,182 50.67 3.24 16.31
Total 100 81.6 715,307 45.7
Economy average 8,767 560.4 24.02 1.54 7.73
Benchmark scenario
(year 2004)
Population GDP GDP per capita GDP per capita per day
Source: Nielsen (2002), General Statistics Office Of Vietnam, Haughton et al (2006), IMF WEO, Penn World Table (2006), and own
calculations
1: PPP correction is 5,035 (IMF WEO)
Table 6: Detailed income distribution based on the Vietnam Model
5Using a Lorenz-curve shape that matches the Vietnamese Gini-coe¢ cient in table 2. The Lorenz-curve is
inspired by an expenditure-based Lorenz-curve in Haughton et al. (2006).
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Finally, in performing the evaluation of the WTO accession rules we need to know the initial
level of tari¤s. We take these tari¤s to be the bound tari¤ rates that Vietnam was obliged to
have in 2007 before entering WTO. These rates (together with the nal rates to be implemented
in 2014) are attached to the WTO document WT/ACC/VNM/48/Add.1, which is downloadable
from WTOs homepage. However, since these rates are reported at a very disaggregate tari¤
line level  e.g. it contains 1,700-1,800 line items on agricultural products and about 13,000
items on manufacturing products, all at an 8-digit HS trade classication  we need rst to
aggregate them. We have used the following step procedure: (i) calculate simple tari¤ averages
of detailed HS data to create two-digit level HS data, (ii) convert the two-digit level HS data
to two-digit level SITC data (as we only have detailed trade data for this categorization),6 (iii)
calculate weighted average tari¤ on one-digit level SITC categories, where the weights are the
trade volumes at the two-digit level SITC,7 and (iv) convert the SITC categorization to the
average tari¤ rates that our four sectors face using the information from the General Statistics
O¢ ce of Vietnam (GSO, 2004) about ownership.8 The result of this procedure is presented
in row one (benchmark) and row two (nal accession rates) of table 7  the rest of the rows
present other tari¤ reform scenarios examined in this paper and which are explained in detail
below.
Scenarios p roe l soe
Benchmark - 2007 tari¤ rates 28:1 13:5 13:3 19:4
I - nal accession 2014 tari¤ rates 22:9 11:0 8:1 15:7
II - Concertina cut 19:4 13:5 13:3 19:4
III - proportional 20 per cent cut 22:5 10:8 10:6 15:5
IV - subsidy experiment 28:1 13:5 13:3  32:0
V - restructuring SOEs + benchmark rates 28:1 13:5 13:3 19:4
VI - restructuring SOEs + nal 2014 rates 22:9 11:0 8:1 15:7
VII - restructuring SOEs + concertina cut 19:4 13:5 13:3 19:4
VIII - restructuring SOEs + proportional cut 22:5 10:8 10:6 15:5
Source: WTO, Comtrade, own calculations
Table 7: Tari¤ rates applied in the scenarios, per cent
3.1. The analyzed scenarios. As mentioned above, the benchmark scenario replicates the
tari¤ structure of the Vietnamese economy at the point of entry at the WTO, i.e. in 2007. In
6See table A1 in the appendix for these tari¤ averages (both the bound 2007 and the nal 2014 rates).
7Reported at table A2 in the appenidx.
8This ownership information is presented in table A3 in the appendix.
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that benchmark case, the model in section 2 is used, where state-owned enterprises maximize
revenues. Scenarios I-IV in table 7 are all using the same model but with di¤erent tari¤ rates.
Scenario I is applying the WTO accession-led tari¤ cuts that Vietnam has committed to
implement by 2014. As we see, the most notable relative drop is within the light manufacturing
sector (a 39% reduction), followed by the SOE sector (19% reduction) and the primary and
ROE sector (18:5% reductions). In terms of absolute tari¤ reductions, the primary and the light
manufacturing sector face a 5:2 percent points cuts, while the SOE face a 3:7 percent points cut
and the ROE only a 2:5 percent point cut. Thus, the WTO accession-led tari¤ cuts reduce both
the mean and the variance of the existent tari¤ structure. As we know from recent results in the
theory of tari¤ reforms, such reductions are likely to be welfare enhancing in standard general
equilibrium trade models (see Anderson and Neary, 2007).
Scenarios II and III focus on other tari¤ reforms that in conventional settings should yield
welfare improvements. In scenario II we introduce a concertina cut, where the highest tari¤ falls
to the second highest tari¤ level, while scenario III introduces a 20% proportional tari¤ cut to
all tari¤ rates. From theory we know that such reductions will also increase welfare if goods are
substitutes for each other and if normality in consumption is assured (see Hatta, 1977) both
assumptions that hold in our setting.
Scenario IV reduces the tari¤ on the SOE produced good leaving the other tari¤ rates
unaltered. In this sense, it is also a univariate reform like the concertina reform, but while the
concertina reform reduces the highest tari¤ (assuming that this is the highest distortion), here we
reduce the tari¤ of the sector that distorts mostly the economy (both due to protection and due
to the assumed revenue maximizing behavior). Thus, in essence, the present scenario is really
what a concertina reform should do in our model, i.e. reduce only the highest distortion. In
order to illustrate the potential gains of such a reform, we calculate the optimal tari¤ reduction.
By using iteration techniques, the rate that maximizes the welfare gain from such a univariate
reform turns out to be a 32% import subsidy.
Scenario V represents a di¤erent model and constitutes thus a di¤erent benchmark for the
rest of the scenarios. We apply the initial 2007 tari¤ structure within a model that does not
contain the assumed state-owned enterprise behavior. This scenario should capture the e¤ects
of a complete reformation of the SOEs (so that they now behave as prot maximizers and not as
output maximizers) prior to the reformation of tari¤s. The following 3 scenarios, VI, VII, and
VIII, use this new benchmark situation and allow for tari¤ reforms. Scenario VI allows for the
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nal 2014 WTO-imposed tari¤ rates; scenario VII allows for a concertina cut, and scenario VIII
allows for a proportional cut. Such a sequence of scenarios should capture the extra gains that
we may get from external (tari¤) reforms when internal (SOE) reforms are already in place.9
4. Results from different counterfactuals
Table 8 below presents the main results from the di¤erent scenarios.10 We focus on production
e¢ ciency, real income and consumption, real factor rewards, and consumerswelfare change.
Main scenarios Competitive scenarios with
scenario V as benchmark
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Production e¢ ciency 99.9 99.2 100.0 107.8 109.7 100.0 100.2 100.1
Real income 100.0 99.3 100.0 101.0 109.7 100.1 100.3 100.1
Real consumption 99.9 99.2 100.0 107.8 109.7 99.8 97.8 99.5
Real wage 99.3 97.3 99.3 110.1 88.2 99.1 95.8 99.1
Rents to immobile factors 97.3 99.9 97.9 113.4 163.4 97.3 101.2 97.7
Consumer welfare change (pct.)*
Lower income rural household -1.2 -6.6 -1.7 +16.3 +24.3 -1.4 -7.4 -2.1
Lower income urban household +0.7 +2.4 +0.7 -9.8 -12.3 +1.3 +5.0 +1.5
Higher income household +0.5 +2.4 +0.9 +2.1 +7.6 +0.9 +5.2 +1.6
Consumer welfare change, total -0.1 -0.7 0.0 +4.9 +9.7 +0.1 +0.3 +0.1
Source: The model
* Measured as equivalent variation relative to benchmark income
Table 8: Main results
9Before we proceed to the descrption of the results, it is important to note that in comparing the di¤erent
scenarios we use di¤erent reform sizes. While the concertina brings the highest tari¤ down to the second highest
tari¤ level, the proportional reform cuts all tari¤s linearly by 20%, and the WTO accession reform cuts tari¤s
nonlinearly by an average of 26.3%. In scenario IV, we nd the optimal size of the SOE tari¤ in terms of
maximizing welfare gains. Thus, all our scenarios choose di¤erent sizes of tari¤ reductions; a property that in
many ways is not ideal if we wanted to compare the welfare e¤ects, e.g. which reform gives the highest welfare
increase. A better approach would be to set all scenarios at an equal footing (e.g. by requiring that they deliver
the same revenues, or by requiring that they are of the same size) and then see which one performs best (see
Raimondos-Møller and Woodland, 2011). Here we stick to the conventional approach of pre-dening di¤erent
reform sizes and examining only the sign of the e¤ects (and not the size of the e¤ects).
10More detailed tables are presented in appendix 2.
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4.1. Scenarios I - IV: tari¤ reforms under a distorted SOE sector. The assessment
of economy-wide e¢ ciency shows that the implementation of the nal WTO tari¤s (scenario I)
is not overall beneciary to Vietnam, nor is it beneciary for the income inequality that exists
in the country. In fact, the lower income rural population will face a money metric welfare loss
of 1:2% of their income, while the richer households will gain by 0:5%. The reason for this may
be assessed both from the supply side and the demand side of the economy.
On the supply side, the change in the tari¤ scheme is relatively soft on SOE production,
implying that the sector stays relatively protected and still demands an excessive amount of
labour. According to our calculations (see table A7 in the appendix for detailed sector results)
the SOE production consumes 41:4%  up from 41% in the benchmark scenario  of the
e¤ective labour supply. The labour demand e¤ects in the rest of the sectors skew the relative
labour demand toward private and government services and other activities (Lroe) at the expense
of the primary sector (Lp) and the privately manufactured goods sector (Ll).
Since the primary sector production is more sensitive to changes in the size of the labour
supply, production drops signicantly (see table A4). With consumer demand for primary goods
hardly a¤ected, the production fall will reduce the exports of the primary sector (see table A5).
Reduction of exports will reduce the overall Vietnamese purchasing power, per se, and thus the
real consumption overall falls. When the lower income rural population su¤ers the most, it is
due to its high dependency on the primary sector. The fall in the e¤ective labour supply in the
primary sector and the fall in rents to the immobile factor jointly produce the largest relative
decline in real income among the three income groups. It su¤ers a 1:2% real income loss while
the overall loss for the whole population is only 0:1%.
As we discussed previously, the WTO accession-led reform reduces both the simple mean
and variance of the benchmark tari¤ structure. Even if these are desirable properties of a
tari¤ reform, we do not know with certainty whether this particular reform was put wrongly
together.11 Other, more standard, reform rules should be examined. Within the theory of
piecemeal reforms, two rules are standard; the concertina rule and the proportional rule. Both
rules are known to provide welfare gains under very general assumptions. However, with a
state-owned sector distorting resource allocation, such welfare improvements may not arise.
As seen in column II, table 8, performing a concertina cut will worsen welfare in our model.
11 It does not follow the (often used by WTO) Swiss rule, where all tari¤s fall and with the highest tari¤s falling
mostly.
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The reason is simply the following: lowering the highest tari¤ (primary products) implies increas-
ing relative protection for the SOE producers. Thus, instead of reducing the biggest distortion
in the economy, this reform will increase it. This will happen at the expense of especially the
primary sector and thus the labour employed in that sector, which to a large extent is the lower-
income rural population. While the welfare of the urban population will rise, this rise is not
enough to neutralize the loss of the rural households. A proportional cut (column III, table 8)
will again not generate gains since lowering all tari¤s rates proportionally will bring the primary
good tari¤ level closer to the SOE tari¤ level. Thus the SOE sector is again, as in scenarios I and
II, protected at the expense of especially the primary sector. Still, and compared to a concertina
cut, the SOE sectors protection is relatively reduced. In our simulation example, not signi-
cant changes will occur in aggregate real income, production e¢ ciency, and in general agregate
welfare. However, income inequality will denitely increase with the lower income households
loosing out again. Both these two scenarios underline the consequences of underestimating the
presence of a special SOE behavior and thus falsely suggesting concertina or proportional cuts
in the search for welfare gains.
In scenario IV we return to the univariate type of reforms where only one tari¤ is reduced.
However, now we choose a di¤erent tari¤ than the highest one. Let us explain. When tari¤s
are the only distortions in a model, reducing the highest tari¤ is usually equivalent to reducing
the biggest distortion. However, when other distortions are in place, the highest tari¤ may
not be equivalent with the biggest distortion. In the present model the sector that distorts
mostly the e¢ cient allocation of resources is the sector with state-owned enterprises. Even if
that sector does not face the highest tari¤ protection, it is that sectors tari¤ that should be
reduced. Leaving thus all the other tari¤s unaltered, scenario IV allows the tari¤ of the SOE
sector to fall.12
The next question then is how much to reduce that tari¤.13 In what follows we use iteration
techniques and perform a numerical search for the locally optimal SOE tari¤, i.e. a SOE tari¤
that maximizes the aggregate welfare gain given that the other tari¤s do not change. As can be
read from table 7, this optimal tari¤ turns out to be negative, i.e. an import subsidy, and equal
to 32%: By subsidizing the imports of the goods produced by the state-owned enterprises, the
12Note that an alternative reform would be not to constrain the direction of the tari¤ reform, and thus to allow
raising the protection in other sectors. However, since such reforms can not be part of a WTO-based reform, we
abstract from such reforms in this paper.
13Since tari¤ levels do not provide much information in this setting, we can not follow the "down to the second
highest tari¤ level"-type of rule.
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aggregate welfare will rise by 4:9% with the poor rural households beneting the most and thus
reducing inequality (see column IV, table 8). The mechanisms for such results are based on the
fact that the e¤ective supply of labour to the state-owned sector will drop to 20:8% (down from
41:2%), leaving labour to be re-allocated to other sectors where its use is more e¢ cient. As a
result of this, the primary sector ends up increasing its exports. In general, trade as part of the
countrys GDP increases considerably (see table A5 in the appendix).
In general what such a reform shows is that the ingredient that is necessary to be included in
a welfare increasing tari¤ reform is a large and disproportionate reduction of the tari¤ faced by
the SOE sector. This sector has been attracting too many recourses, and as long as this sector
is not reformed fundamentally, one should subsidize the imports of the goods produced by the
state-owned enterprises. This will reduce the domestic production of these goods and move the
freed-up inputs towards other sectors where they can be better used.
4.2. Scenarios V-VIII: tari¤ reforms under a competitive SOE sector. We now
move to a di¤erent situation, where tari¤ reforms are performed after reforming the SOE sector
into a competitive sector. Clearly, in that situation the rental rate of capital in the SOE sector
will not be zero anymore. Firms in that sector will now have an incentive to choose a more
balanced use of capital and labour, and capital rents will be distributed back to households. To
create a new benchmark for analysing tari¤ liberalisation, we rst allow for such internal reforms
when no external reforms are put into place (the initial tari¤ rates are still in place); this is the
situation depicted in scenario V.14 As it is easy to see from table 8, internal reforms result in
large gains in all accounts; an overall welfare increase by 9:7%;a reduction of income inequality
with the lower income households experiencing a large 24:3% increase in their income; a 9:7%
increase in production e¢ ciency, real income, and real consumption. All that while wages fall
across all sectors and income from rents to imobile factors increases by 63:4%:
As we have discussed above, the non-competitive nature of the SOE sector is the largest
distortion in the Vietnamese economy and reforning that sector creates large overall gains. An
economy wide e¢ ciency improvement of 9:7% compared to the benchmark level is unleashed
through a migration of e¤ective labour resources to the primary sector (see table 7 in the
appendix). This underlines that SOEs rst and foremost attract labour resources from the sector
with the most labour intensive production. The primary sector is also the main employment
14Note, however, the caveat mentioned in footnote 8.
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sector of the Vietnamese economy, employing some 58% of the working population. Hence,
it is no surprise that the lower-income rural Vietnamese population is the big winner of an
SOE reform. An increase in real income of 24:3% (table A9, appendix) to the lower-income
rural population brings the average GDP per capita per day from 0:90 dollars to 1:11 dollars.
The lower-income urban population stands to lose considerably from the restructuring since an
important income source, SOE employment, is downsized dramatically. However, the money-
metric welfare gains accrued to the two other population groups by far exceeds the loss of
the lower-income urban population. Thus, by redistributing ex post, Pareto improvement is
attainable.
The surge in economic activity in the exporting primary sector improves the purchasing
power of the Vietnamese economy, adding to the welfare gains. This is also the essence of the
gains from trade: optimal production induces trade patterns that improve consumer welfare by
exporting goods of the sector in which the country is relatively more competitive, and importing
what is relatively unfavorable to produce domestically.
If now, on top of these internal reforms, we allow tari¤ reductions then there will be extra
gains to the economy. However, these gains are now marginal and of the order one would expect
in standard competitive setups. As seen in collumns VI-VII of table 8, a WTO-imposed tari¤
reduction will lead to an extra overall welfare gain of 0:1%, while a concertina and a proportional
refrom will increase welfare by 0:3% and 0:1% respectively, compared to the benchmark situation
described in collumn V. While the concertina and the proportional cuts were expected to give
welfare gains (proven in theory), the fact that the WTO-accession tari¤cuts also give comparable
welfare gains is reassuring.15
5. Concluding remarks
Developing countries, especially socialist oriented developing countries, highly rely on state
production. Indeed, Vietnam relies heavily on state industrial production. Such a predominant
position of state-owned enterprises needs special consideration or otherwise mistaken policy
conclusions can be made. The policy that this paper considers is the trade liberalization scheme
that WTO has imposed on Vietnam upon its accession into the WTO in 2007. Tari¤s have to
fall in a pre-dened way by 2014. As we show, the ultimate gains from trade liberalization on
economic development in Vietnam will be greatly at stake due to the distortions created by the
15The size of these welfare e¤ects are specic to the simulations performed here and have no generalization
power  see footnote 9 above.
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strong presence of state-owned enterprises.
In the model it is assumed that the management in a state-owned enterprise pursues maxi-
mization of revenues instead of prots. Such behavior induces over-hiring of labour, attracting
extra labour resources from the competitive sectors of the economy. Trade policy should take
this into account and design tari¤s in order to correct this over-production.16
The WTO accession-led tari¤ reform does not take all this into account. Tari¤s on state-
owned produced goods fall, but not a lot  other sectorstari¤s fall even more. As a result,
the WTO accession tari¤ cuts will worsen the situation for Vietnam with the state-owned sector
expanding even more. There are also distributional consequences to be aware of. Our results
show that the aggregate welfare loss will hit mostly the lower-income rural population. These are
the people that work in the sensitive labour-intensive primary sector. As generally recognized,
this rural population is the prime source of poverty in developing countries, so the fact that the
welfare losses are primarily within the lower end of the income scale demands special attention.
Policy makers must recognize that state-owned produced goods have to undergo relatively
larger trade liberalization than competitively produced goods to secure the gains from trade.
Therefore, not even other traditional tari¤ reforms (such as proportional tari¤ cuts and con-
certina cuts) will work in this setting. Such reforms will fail to reduce su¢ ciently the protection
of the state-owned sector and thus bound to fail. Indeed, our calculations show that this is
clearly the case.
Inspired by the basic principle behind the concertina tari¤ cut reform, viz. that we should
reduce the highest distortion, we suggest a tari¤ reform that targets the highest distortion in
the present model. We reduce the tari¤ of the state-owned enterprises leaving the other tari¤s
unchanged. To show the potential that such a reform can have, we search for the tari¤ level
that will maximize the potential welfare gains. It turns out that the imports of the state-owned
produced good should be subsidized by 32%: In that case, both the aggregate welfare and the
welfare of the low income rural population will rise considerably.
Clearly, if Vietnam was able to complete within the accession period a reform of state-owned
enterprises so that they become competitive, the WTO accession schedule of nal rates, as all
other conventional tari¤ reforms, will yield aggregate welfare gains. However, such a complete
restructuring of the state-owned enterprises is far from what is going on in reality.
16The optimal tari¤ levels for such a small open economy are clearly not zero.
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Appendix 1: Additional data
per cent
SITC Group Bound Final
01 Meat and meat preparations 30,0 16,6
02 Dairy products and birds’ eggs 23,5 19,5
03 Fish (not marine mammals), crustaceans,
molluscs and aquatic invertebrates, and
preparations thereof
31,1 20,1
04 Cereals and cereal preparations 28,5 23,7
05 Vegetables and fruit 29,1 24,1
06 Sugars, sugar preparations and honey 36,2 31,5
07 Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices, and manufactures
thereof 29,4 23,7
08 Feeding stuff for animals (not including
unmilled cereals) 8,0 5,0
09 Misc. edible products etc 31,5 22,8
11 Beverages 60,7 45,4
12 Tobacco and tobacco manufactures 109,6 99,6
21 Hides, skins and furskins, raw 5,0 2,4
22 Oil-seeds and oleaginous fruits 10,5 8,3
23 Crude rubber (including synthetic and
reclaimed) 6,0 4,8
24 Cork and wood 0,5 0,5
25 Pulp and waste paper 1,4 1,1
26 Textile fibres (other than wool tops and other
combed wool) and their wastes (not
manufactured into yarn or fabric)
12,4 5,8
27 Crude fertilizers, other than those of Division
56, and crude minerals (excluding coal,
petroleum and precious stones)
6,7 6,7
28 Metalliferous ore, scrap 2,2 2,2
29 Crude animal and vegetable materials, n.e.s. 5,3 4,5
rates per cent
SITC Group Bound Final
33 Petroleum, petroleum products and related materials23,3 23,2
34 Gas, natural and manufactured 4,5 4,5
74 General industrial machinery and equipment,
n.e.s., and machine parts, n.e.s. 10,5 8,3
75 Office machines and automatic data-
processing machines 7,4 1,5
76 Telecommunications and sound-recording and
reproducing apparatus and equipment 17,8 11,0
77 Electrical machinery, apparatus and
appliances, n.e.s., and electrical parts thereof
(including non-electrical counterparts, n.e.s., of
electrical household-type equipment)
12,4 9,2
78 Road vehicles (including air-cushion vehicles) 55,8 41,6
79 Other transport equipment 7,1 5,8
81 Prefabricated buildings sanitary, plumbing,
heating and lighting fixtures and fittings, n.e.s. 20,2 15,5
83 Travel goods, handbags and similar
containers 39,1 25,0
84 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories 21,2 19,5
85 Footwear 35,6 27,1
87 Professional, scientific and controlling
instruments and apparatus, n.e.s. 2,4 1,3
88 Photographic apparatus, equipment and
supplies and optical goods, n.e.s. watches and
clocks
12,6 8,6
89 Miscellaneous manufactured articles, n.e.s. 20,4 15,0
93 Special transactions and commodities not
classified according to kind 0,0 0,0
97 Gold, non-monetary (excluding gold ores and
concentrates) 1,5 1,5
rates
Table A1: Average tari¤ rates, 2-digit SITC categories: 00-20, and 30-90
rates (%)
SITC Group Bound 2007 rates Final 2014 rates
0 Food, foodstu¤ and live animals 21:5 16:6
1 Beverages and tobacco 103:4 92:7
2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 5:8 3:7
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 22:6 22:6
4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and wax 17:0 14:3
5 Chemical and related products, n.e.s. 13:0 6:5
6 Manufactured goods classied chiey by materials 15:1 12:2
7 Machinery, transport and equipment 22:2 16:1
8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 20:0 15:7
9 Other 1:5 1:5
Source: Comtrade, WTO and own calculations
Table A2: Average tari¤ rates, 1-digit SITC categories
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By kind of economic activity GDP Share Vietnam Model Sector Ownership
Agriculture 16,7 Primary Private
Forestry 1,3 Primary Private
Fishing 3,8 Primary Private
Mining and quarrying 10,1 SOE State
Manufacturing 20,3 SOE/Private State/Private
Electricity, gas and water supply 3,5 SOE/Private State/Private
Construction 6,2 SOE/Private State/Private
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor
vehicles,
motor cycles and  personal and household goods 13,6 ROE Private
Hotels and restaurants 3,2 ROE Private
Transport, storage and communications 4,3 ROE Private
Financial intermedation 1,8 ROE State
Scientific activities and technology 0,6 ROE State
Real estate, renting and business activities 4,4 ROE Private
Public administration and  defence; compulsory
social security 2,7
ROE
State
Education and training 3,3 ROE State
Health and social work 1,5 ROE State
Recreational, cultural and sporting activities 0,5 ROE Private
Activities of party and of membership
organisations 0,1 ROE State
Community, social and personal service activities 2,0 ROE State
Private households with employed persons 0,2 ROE Private
Source: GSO (2004)
Table A3: Sector allocation in the model
Appendix 2: Detailed results from simulations
benchmark = index 100 Bencmark I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Primary sector 100.0 97.7 85.8 96.6 143.6 169.4 98.5 91.6 97.7
Priv. and gov. services,
and other activities 100.0 101.2 103.2 101.2 108.4 112.4 101.4 104.7 101.4
Private manufacturing 100.0 98.9 103.2 101.2 108.4 112.4 99.1 104.7 101.5
State manufacturing 100.0 100.2 101.5 100.2 81.5 63.0 100.3 102.1 100.3
Total economy 100.0 99.9 99.2 100.0 107.8 109.7 100.0 100.2 100.1
Source: The Vietnam model
Scenarios VI-VIII are relative to scenario V.
Table A4: Production e¢ ciency
Primary sector -9.2 -8.5 -5.2 -8.1 -20.5 -20.9 -20.1 -16.5 -19.7
Priv. and gov. services,
and other activities 5.4 4.9 3.8 5.0 -1.7 4.6 4.1 2.8 4.1
Private manufacturing -6.6 -6.3 -7.1 -6.8 -8.2 -6.8 -6.6 -7.5 -7.1
State manufacturing 7.5 7.8 6.8 7.8 25.0 17.8 18.4 17.6 18.4
Source: The Vietnam model
Benchmark II III VI IVper cent VII VIIIVI
Table A5: Net trade (% of GDP)
benchmark = index 100 Bencmark I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Primary sector 100 93.8 80.0 92.4 143.6 169.4 94.6 85.4 93.4
Priv. and gov. services,
and other activities 100 98.9 103.2 98.8 108.4 112.4 99.1 104.7 99.0
Private manufacturing 100 94.4 103.2 98.8 108.4 112.4 94.6 104.7 99.1
State manufacturing
Total economy 100 97.3 99.9 97.9 113.4 163.4 97.3 101.2 97.7
Source: The Vietnam model
Scenarios VI-VIII are relative to scenario V.
Table A6: Rents to immobile factors
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I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Primary sector 25.1 24.3 20.7 24.0 39.2 48.1 47.3 43.2 46.7
Priv. and gov. services,
and other activities 26.0 26.7 27.8 26.7 30.8 33.2 34.2 36.5 34.2
Private manufacturing 7.7 7.6 8.3 7.9 9.1 9.9 9.7 10.9 10.2
State manufacturing 41.2 41.4 43.2 41.4 20.8 8.8 8.9 9.5 8.9
Source: Vietnam Model
Note: Percentage share of the total effective labour force
Per cent Benchmark
Table A7: E¤ective labour supply
Benchmark I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Lower income rural
household 0.85 99.3 97.3 99.3 110.1 88.2 99.1 95.8 99.1
Lower income urban
household 0.85 99.4 97.2 99.3 110.0 88.2 99.1 95.7 99.0
Higher income
household 0.85 99.5 98.0 99.5 107.1 88.2 99.3 96.4 99.2
Source: The Vietnam model
Real wage Scenario wage levels (benchmark = index 100)
Note: The model operates with a single nominal wage rate meausered per effective labour unit. Real wage rates are based on
expenditure weighted priceindices according to household consumption spending compositions. Scenarios VI-VIII are relative to
scenario V.
Table A8: Real wage by household
per cent I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Lower income rural
household -1.1 -6.6 -1.6 +12.0 +24.3 -1.0 -5.6 -1.6
Lower income urban
household +0.7 +2.5 +0.8 -13.1 -12.3 +1.1 +4.2 +1.2
Higher income
household +0.5 +2.5 +1.0 -1.6 +7.6 +0.7 +4.1 +1.3
Total 0.0 -0.7 0.0 +1.0 +9.7 +0.1 +0.3 +0.1
Source: The Vietnam model
Note: Real income is measured as household nominal income deflated by an expenditure weighted price index specific
to each household. Scenarios VI-VIII are relative to scenario V.
Table A9: Real income changes
benchmark = index 100 Bencmark I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Primary sector 100 101.0 105.2 101.5 88.6 109.3 101.2 106.5 101.6
Priv. and gov. services,
and other activities
100 99.4 98.4 99.5 88.9 109.9 99.5 99.3 99.6
Private manufacturing 100 101.5 99.3 99.7 87.9 108.1 101.6 100.4 99.8
State manufacturing 100 100.1 98.4 100.2 139.5 109.9 100.2 99.3 100.3
Total economy 100 99.9 99.2 100.0 107.8 109.7 101.6 109.1 102.4
Source: The Vietnam model
Scenarios VI-VIII are relative to scenario V.
Table 10: Real consumption changes by sector
benchmark = index 100 Bencmark I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Lower income rural
household 100 98.8 93.3 98.3 119.5 124.3 99.0 94.4 98.4
Lower income urban
household 100 100.7 102.4 100.7 92.7 87.7 99.0 94.4 98.4
Higher income
household 100 100.5 102.3 100.9 105.0 107.6 99.8 97.3 99.4
Total economy 100 99.9 99.2 100.0 107.8 109.7 99.8 97.8 99.5
Source: The Vietnam model
Scenarios VI-VIII are relative to scenario V.
Table A11: Real consumption changes by household
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Appendix 3: Data sources
Our main sources of data are the following:
 Comtrade, United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database, at
 http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade/.
 European Commission:
Trade issues: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/newround/index_en.htm
GSP 2003: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/global/gsp/gspguide.htm
External relations: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/index.htm
External relations with Vietnam:
 http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/vietnam/intro/index.htm
 GSO, General Statistics O¢ ce of Vietnam, http://www.gso.gov.vn/
 IMF, 2006, various online information incl. statistics. WEO: World Economic Outlook
Database.
 Heston, A., R. Summers, and B. Aten, 2006, Penn World Table Version 6.2, Center for
International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Penn-
sylvania.
 World Bank, 2007, World Development Indicators database,
 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf.
 WTO, World Trade Organisation, various online information incl. statistics:
 http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm
 and http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/schedules_e/goods_schedules_e.htm
 http://www.wto.org/WT/ACC/VNM/48/Add.1
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Chapter 2
Import, O¤shoring and Wages:
Rent Sharing or Composition?
by
Henrik Barslund Fosse & Madhura Maitra
Abstract: O¤shoring rms are found to pay higher average wages than purely domestic
rms. We provide a unifying empirical approach by capturing the di¤erent channels through
which o¤shoring may explain this wage di¤erence: (i) due to change in the composition of
workers (skill composition e¤ect) (ii) because all existing workers get higher pay (rent sharing
e¤ect). Using Danish worker-rm data we explain how much each channel contributes to higher
wages. To estimate the causal e¤ect of o¤shoring on wages we use Chinas accession to the WTO
in December 2001 and the soon after boom in Chinese exports  as positive exogenous shocks
to the incentive to o¤shore to China. Both skill composition and rent sharing e¤ects are found
to be important in explaining the resultant gain in wages. We also show that the rms timing
in the o¤shoring process determines the relative importance of a channel. For rms o¤shoring to
China in 2002 but not in 1999, only rent sharing explains the gain in wages. For rms o¤shoring
to China both before and after Chinas WTO accession the wage increase is explained mostly by
the skill composition e¤ect. Moreover, these patterns are not discernible from the measures of
skill composition and rent sharing available in typical rm level datasets like ratio of educated
to uneducated workers and sales per employee.
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1. Introduction
One of the pertinent questions regarding globalization is: how does globalization a¤ect wages?
In this paper we address a particular aspect of that question: how does o¤shoring1 a¤ect rm
level average wage? O¤shoring rms are found to pay higher average wages than purely domestic
rms (Bernard et al 2007). Guided by existing theory, we provide empirical analyses of di¤erent
possible channels through which o¤shoring can cause rm average wage di¤erentials. O¤shoring
may push up rm level average wage in di¤erent ways: rst, if rms o¤shore low-skilled low-wage
tasks that automatically increases the average wage of the remaining jobs. We call this the skill
composition e¤ect. Second, o¤shoring can be viewed as new technology that rms adopt to
reduce costs and increase revenue and prots. In a labor market environment featuring search,
screening and bargaining frictions, o¤shoring rms and their workers bargain over rm specic
rents o¤shoring induced rents can increase wages of all existing workers and thus increase
average wages in these o¤shoring rms. We call this the rent sharing e¤ect.
We explain how much each e¤ect contributes towards higher average wages in o¤shoring
rms. Papers in the o¤shoring literature look at one channel at a time but not both. It is
possible that both e¤ects exist in the data and looking at one channel by ignoring the other may
confound the results. In the past few years o¤shoring has become a major trading activity. The
impact of o¤shoring on parent country labor outcomes stirs public controversy. We carefully
investigate Danish worker-rm data to disentangle the e¤ects of the two suggested mechanisms
on rm average wages. It is important to distinguish the two e¤ects from one another as policy
makers would draw diametrically opposite conclusions from either e¤ect. While we document
the presence of the skill composition e¤ect, underlining that certain jobs in Danish rms do move
out of the country, we also document that Danish rms benet from increased protability and
share this increased protability with workers, i.e. through rent sharing. Thus the presence of
the one channel, skill composition, highlights what developed nations worry about, but there is
also the rent sharing channel that tells a positive story about o¤shoring, and for some rms we
nd that the latter channel completely accounts for the di¤erential wage gains from o¤shoring.
Identifying the causal relationship between o¤shoring and higher rm level average wage is
di¢ cult. First, rms endogenously select into o¤shoring: rms that o¤shore are, on average,
larger, more productive, and tend to pay higher wages than smaller rms that are less productive
1O¤shoring here refers to a fragmentation of the production process due to relocation of jobs from the home
country to the foreign country.
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and less likely to o¤shore. Second, higher skilled workers may select into o¤shoring rms because
these rms are bigger and pay higher wages. Thus, separating the causal story from the selection
story is important, i.e. to say whether the higher average wage paid in o¤shoring rms stems
from o¤shoring per se or from higher productivity that simultaneously leads to more o¤shoring,
higher output, and wages.
We use Danish worker-rm data that tracks the universe of Danish workers across the uni-
verse of Danish rms. This amazingly rich dataset provides detailed information on individual
wage histories from which we are able to construct measures of skill composition e¤ect and rent
sharing e¤ect at the rm level. Following Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) (henceforth
AKM), and Frias, Kaplan, and Verhoogen (2012),2 we decompose the rm level average wage
in each year into an average person component, reecting the skill composition of the work-
force, and a rm component which we interpret as the measure of time-varying rm specic rent
sharing.
We use events in China to identify the causal e¤ect of a change in the incentive to o¤shoring
on rm level average wages. We argue that two possibly related events occurred: First, Chinas
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001 created a surge in for-
eign rms operating in China as well as new Chinese exporters. Upon accession, China made
enormous changes to meet its WTO obligations including among other things restructuring
industries, publishing previously internal laws and regulations, establishing formal procedures
to adjudicate disputes, leveling the playing eld for foreign rms, and giving all rms right to
trade. These changes were phased in gradually over a transition period, usually within three
years after accession, directly inuencing rms incentive to o¤shore to China. Second, there
was a boom in Chinese world exports around 2003 driven by the structural changes undertaken
by the Chinese government around that time. This led Chinese exports to more than double
from 400 billion US dollars in 2002 to 900 billion in 2005. The surge in Chinese exports acted
as an additional indirect incentive for rms in Denmark to source from China in order to main-
tain competitiveness with rms who would have cost advantage by sourcing cheaper Chinese
resources. Thus, Chinas joining the WTO can be viewed as a shock to the trading environment
in China and the observed Chinese export boom as a cost/technology shock, to which we expect
Danish rms to respond. In fact, we do see a jump in the Danish share of imports from China
in 2003, indicating that Danish rms were a¤ected by the shock.
2For an extended and more detailed version, see Frias, Kaplan, and Verhoogen (2011).
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The rst step of our analyses is to ensure that within industries, rms o¤shoring to China
were a¤ected di¤erently compared to rms who were not o¤shoring to China in the 2002-2005
period.3 Next we check that the di¤erential change was greater during the shock period, 2002
-2005, compared to an earlier period, 1999 -2001. This procedure ensures that we are identifying
trend di¤erentials between two completely di¤erent periods and thus not trend di¤erentials, a
priori, between two types of rms the treatment and the control group.
We nd that, between 2002-2005 average wage increased around 1.5 percent more in rms
o¤shoring to China compared to the control group. The skill composition e¤ect accounted for a
quarter of the di¤erential increase while the rest was explained by rent sharing. Our results are
robust to controlling for underlying trend di¤erences i.e. comparing the wage gain in 2002-2005
with an earlier period, 1999-2001. Splitting rms up by their o¤shoring status in China we nd
heterogeneous results: The di¤erential wage increase between the two periods was the largest
for the new o¤shorers i.e. rms o¤shoring to China in 20024 but not in 19995 and was explained
by rent sharing only. The continuing o¤shorers i.e. rms that o¤shored to China in both 1999
and 2002 experienced di¤erential wage increase between the two periods mostly through the skill
composition e¤ect. Firms o¤shoring to China in 1999 but not in 2002 showed no di¤erential
wage change in this period. These heterogeneous patterns are not discernable when we use
common proxies for measures of skill composition and rent sharing available in the typical rm
level datasets.6 The di¤erence in results when using measures of composition and rent sharing
e¤ects from the rm level data to those constructed from the worker-rm data shows that we
should draw results from the typical rm level data (commonly used in the o¤shoring literature)
with more caution.
In addition to papers that use linked worker-rm and rm level data our work is related
to a number of papers using industry level data. Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1997) show that
o¤shoring a¤ects rm level average wage by a¤ecting the skill composition of the domestic work-
force. Becker, Ekholm & Muendler (2009) nd evidence that o¤shoring is associated with a shift
towards more non-routine and interactive tasks as well as a shift towards more educated work-
ers (skill composition e¤ect) in German MNEs. In these models the labor market is assumed
to be perfectly competitive and cannot account for possible rent sharing e¤ects. Allowing for
3 In particular the control group used in the results presented in this paper includes rms o¤shoring to other
low middle-income countries but not China in 2002 and non-o¤shoring rms.
4 i.e. the beginning of the dened shock period.
5 i.e. the beginning of the dened pre-shock period.
6Such as ratio of educated to uneducated workers and sales per employee.
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imperfectly competitive labor market, Bagger, Christensen & Mortensen (2010) nd evidence of
rent sharing in the Danish labor market, but their paper does not address the o¤shoring issue.
Sethupathys (2008) bargaining model assumes homogeneous labor and shows that o¤shoring in-
creases productivity and protability of o¤shoring rms compared to non-o¤shoring rms. The
di¤erential increases lead to higher domestic wages at o¤shoring rms through a positive rent
sharing mechanism. Using US MNE rm level data he provides evidence that higher average
wages at o¤shoring rms is consistent with a rent sharing mechanism. However, his outcome is
also consistent with the skill composition e¤ect and his results do indicate that the skill com-
position e¤ect is present. Kramarz (2008) also uses a bargaining model to show that o¤shoring
can a¤ect wages directly by altering rmsthreat point and thus changing the overall quasi-rent
shared between rms and workers. His model shows that level of union strength matters, with
rms facing stronger unions o¤shore more, decreasing the size of the quasi-rent to discipline
workers. Using French worker-rm data he shows that rms facing stronger unions increased
o¤shoring more with an associated decline in employment and rents. His results indicate that
o¤shoring might have a dampening e¤ect on wages through the rent sharing mechanism. His
paper also assumes homogeneous labor and is silent about the skill composition channel.
Our data has rich information on worker types and jobs performed and would be able to
address rent sharing and the composition e¤ect simultaneously. Hummels et. al. (2010) analyze
the relationship between o¤shoring and workerswages and employment opportunities also using
Danish employer-employee data. They nd that exogenous import shocks increase wages of
skilled labors and decrease wages of unskilled workers, whereas shocks to exporting increases
wages of both types of workers. Our results complement their ndings on wages and shocks to
o¤shoring; we show that o¤shoring a¤ects average wages through both skill composition and rent
sharing e¤ects, and how much each of the two channels contribute relative to each other. A paper
close to ours in terms of econometric methodology is Frias, Kaplan & Verhoogen (FKV 2012),7
and, in addition, we use their method for constructing measures of rm level skill composition
and rent sharing e¤ect from the worker level data.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we discuss the theoretical motivation behind our
work. Section 3 describes the dataset. Section 4 discusses the econometric methodology and
identication strategy. In section 5.1 we use rm level measures similar to what has been used
in the o¤shoring literature in the absence of worker-rm data. In section 5.2 we make full use
7For an extended and more detailed version, see Frias, Kaplan, and Verhoogen (2011).
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of the worker-rm data to decompose rm level average wage into a skill component and a rent
sharing component and analyze how a shock in the incentive to o¤shoring a¤ects average wages
through these channels. Section 6 does robustness checks and section 7 concludes.
2. Theoretical Motivation
In this section we briey sketch the theoretical motivation behind our work. Suppose there are
heterogeneous rms who di¤er in terms of productivity; heterogeneous workers who vary at the
skill level; imperfections in the labor market with presence of search costs, screening and wage
bargaining leading to rent sharing between rms and workers. As a result, wage of each worker
type depends on the share of rm-specic rents. We do not assume any particular form of rent
sharing i.e. the form can be prot sharing, revenue sharing or both.8 Both high skilled and
low skilled tasks are required for production of a good. Either type of task can be o¤shored
which involves a marginal cost and a common xed cost. Heterogeneous rms and xed cost
of o¤shoring imply that only the most productive rms can endogenously select into o¤shoring.
The less productive rms must source from the home market.
A new o¤shoring opportunity can be viewed as new technology involving a xed cost and a
lower marginal cost compared to sourcing from the home market. Following a fall in the cost
of o¤shoring, more rms will be able to take advantage of this technology but some rms will
still not be productive enough to overcome the xed cost. The new o¤shoring opportunity will
imply displacement of jobs in rms that o¤shore. Thus, a fall in the cost of o¤shoring changes
the skill composition in the o¤shoring rms compared to the non-o¤shoring rms. If relatively
low skilled, low wage jobs are sent abroad then onshore skill composition increases. Because
skilled labor earns higher wage, o¤shoring increases the average onshore wage through a pure
composition e¤ect. This e¤ect was rst suggested in Feenstra and Hanson (1996). We call this
the skill composition e¤ect on rm level average wage.9
We expect that rms become more cost e¢ cient by taking advantage of new o¤shoring
opportunities. This e¤ect leads to a reallocation of production and prots towards the o¤shoring
rms. If rent sharing exists between rms and workers then the wage of the average worker
increases in o¤shoring rms and falls in the disadvantaged, non-o¤shoring rms. We call the
8Some commonly used, empirical proxies of rm specic rents are: sales per employee (revenue) or prots per
employee (prot sharing).
9This e¤ect works both ways for the skill composition: If high-skill jobs are o¤shored the skill composition
falls onshore causing the average onshore wage to fall. Recent empirical evidence suggests that o¤shorability does
not solely depend on the skill level of the task but rather on the degree of routineness and inter-activeness of the
task. So o¤shoring can indeed decrease the onshore skill composition.
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second e¤ect the rent sharing e¤ect. Thus both the skill composition and the rent sharing e¤ects
could be responsible for higher domestic wages at o¤shoring rms compared to non-o¤shoring
rms. Our empirical approach in sections 4.2 and 5.2 investigates how much each channel
contributes towards higher average wage in o¤shoring rms. While the skill composition e¤ect
provides evidence for the type of jobs o¤shored within rms, the rent sharing e¤ect is evidence
for the rmsprotability and their survival in the market. It is important to distinguish between
the two e¤ects, since these two e¤ects will have di¤erent policy implications .
For a simple illustration of the two e¤ects at work, let us consider the very simple case of
two types of labor: low skilled (L) and high skilled (H) labor. Onshore rm level average wage
w can be expressed as:
w =
X
f=L;H
sfwf ; f = fL;Hg
where sf is onshore skill type share and wf is onshore skill type wage. We can decompose the
discrete change in rm level average wage that we observe in the data as
 w =
X
f=L;H
wfsf +
X
f=L;H
sfwf (1)
The rst term on the right hand side is the change in rm level average wage due to a change
in skill composition and the second term is the change in average wage brought about through
a change in the wage of each type of worker, e.g. due to a rent sharing mechanism.
Many settings can lead to simultaneous increase of revenues and prots with wages. We
suggest a causal explanation by using a shock in the incentive to o¤shore and splitting up the
e¤ect on rm average wages into two channels: 1) skill composition change that a¤ects rm
average wage and 2) changes in prots that are shared through rent bargaining leading to all
wages increasing at the rm and thus also rm average wages.
Other possible explanations include that more productive rms induce higher learning and
thus higher wages. O¤shoring rms may transfer knowledge across the border and increase
worker productivity locally, making their workers otherwise identical to workers in lower pro-
ductivity rms more valuable and thus pay them higher wages (Malchow-Møller, Markusen
& Schjerning, 2007). We believe that this possible explanation is not a likely concern in our
setting: It is not obvious that sourcing from China generates these types of spill-over gains for
workers, and certainly not in the rst years following the broad opening up of China.
One might also think of compensating di¤erentials: To take a job or stay in a job in a sector
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or a rm where workers due to o¤shoring face the risk of being separated from their jobs or
reallocated to less attractive job positions, the rm may have to o¤er workers a compensating
di¤erential. We consider this reasoning amounting essentially to a type of rent sharing: The
management team at the rm still needs stable onshore labor, and workers use their bargaining
power when they see protability at the rm increases.
What we track in our estimates are changes to the level of rm xed e¤ects on rm average
wages during a period. We do not track the composition of the level of worker-rm time-
varying xed e¤ects. Thus, we stick to the concept of rent sharing when talking about estimated
changes to worker-rm xed e¤ects. Note that the conclusions one draws form the two channels
are diametrically opposite. The skill composition channel suggests what kind of jobs Danish
rms o¤shore to China. This channel thus underlines an imminent concern for policy makers 
how to compensate the workforce separated from their jobs as a result of o¤shoring. The rent
sharing e¤ect however underlines that there are positive sides to o¤shoring because it increases
protability of the rm and the rm shares part of the prots with its workers, thus contributing
to improved welfare.
3. Data
Our main data source for this paper is the very rich, Danish, annual, matched, worker-rm panel
from Statistics Denmark. The data currently spans from 1996-2008 and includes data from three
linked databases, FIDA (1996-2008), IDA (1980-2008), and rm level External Trade Statistics
(1990-2008). For our baseline results we use data on manufacturing rms only spanning from
1999-2005. All data are restricted and provided by Statistics Denmark.
FIDA is the Firm Integrated Database for Labor Market Research. It contains the (almost)
full population of rms registered in Denmark. It provides accurate rm level data, including
general, external accounting statistics, number of employees, and a record of individuals em-
ployed in the rms. Via a person key, FIDA can be linked to the Integrated Database for Labor
Market Research (IDA), containing extensive information on socio-economic characteristics of
the population of Danish residents. IDA variables include among others hourly wage, status
on connection to labor market, age, sex, education, experience, tenure, and occupation. Edu-
cation can broadly be classied in three categories: high skilled, requiring tertiary education;
medium skilled, requiring vocational education dened as consumption of secondary education;
and low skilled, dened as persons with short cycle education (typically 1-2 years) or high school
education.
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Via a rm key, we also link the worker-rm panel to rm level External Trade Statistics
(1990-2008). This adds country-product level bilateral external trade data to our dataset.10
Each trade ow contains information on the value of trade in DKK (f.o.b prices for exports and
c.i.f prices for imports), the weight, and the volume. This dataset allows us to investigate the
e¤ect of a change in the incentive to o¤shore on rm level average wage.
Our main results are based on core manufacturing rms (NACE 15-36).11 We consider rms
with 10 or more employees. We also carry out robustness checks where we use our entire sample of
rms. Our measure of o¤shoring is a broad one that includes rmsimports of both intermediate
and consumption goods. For example a positive productivity or cost shock in China might a¤ect
o¤shoring decision of Danish rms, hence their imports and wages. In line with our theoretical
motivation, rms that are able to import consumption and intermediate goods are able to expand
their available potential technologies with associated increase in protability that get translated
into higher rm level average wage through rent sharing. Imports by manufacturing rms will
also a¤ect the kind of tasks (low skill and high skill) performed in the domestic rm and thus
a¤ect rm level skill composition. In our empirical analysis, imports as a share of sales proxy for
o¤shoring at the rm level, and we proxy o¤shoring rms as those sourcing from abroad. Skill
composition and rent sharing measures are constructed from the data using a worker level wage
regression equation and explained in detail in the estimation strategy section. Table 1 provides
comparison of rm level characteristics for the year 2005. Consistent with rm level ndings in
other countries, Danish rms that o¤shore are bigger in terms of employment and sales; have
higher skill ratio (in terms of educated and non-educated workers), prots per employee and
hourly wage, both on average and for each type of employee. For example o¤shoring rms have
on average 85% higher employment and 36% higher sales than non-o¤shoring rms.12 This
result holds for other years in the sample as well. However, these results do not provide a causal
mechanism from o¤shoring to higher wages, which we discuss in the following section.
4. Estimation
We are interested in assessing how a change in the incentive to o¤shore a¤ects rm level average
wage through the skill composition e¤ect and the rent sharing e¤ect. In the rst step we show
10Product classication is the European Combined Nomenclature (CN), 8-digits. We use at the maximum
6-digit level which is consistent with HS-6 classication.
11Manufacturing rms best suit the underlying theoretical motivation and has often been used in empirical
papers in the o¤shoring literature.
12The column to the far right of Table 1 presents results from simple mean di¤erence regressions in Table 1
(i.e. statistical di¤erences between means for o¤horing rms and means for non-o¤shoring rms).
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how rm level average wage can be split into a rent sharing component and a skill component.
Our estimation strategy of decomposing rm level average wage essentially relies on the FKV
technique. In the second step we relate the change in average wage and the two components
arising from an exogenous shock in the incentive to o¤shore to China. We begin by discussing
our second step: the identication strategy. Then we move on to our estimation method.
4.1. Identication Strategy. In this section we argue why we choose 2002-2005 as our
shock period for our di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimations. 1999-2001 will act as our pre-shock
period. In the following discussion we thus refer to the years 1999, 2001, 2002, and 2005 as they
mark the beginning and the end of the two periods considered. We base our segregation of rms
into control and treatment groups based on the rmsstatus in the rst year of the two periods
considered (i.e. 1999 or 2002).
To test how a change in o¤shoring opportunity a¤ects rm level average wage through
composition and rent sharing e¤ects, we use events in China as exogenous shocks in the incentive
to o¤shore to China. The events represent business condition, cost and productivity shocks in
China and are likely to a¤ect many local decisions of Danish rms. Our analysis does not
compare the clean case of increasing wage di¤erentials between rms o¤shoring and rms not
o¤shoring. Instead, the estimations are carried out as increasing wage di¤erentials between rms
taking advantage of a new favorable o¤shoring destination and rms that do not.
China joined the WTO in December 2001, which was a very important event for the Chinese
economy. An export boom occurred in China soon after China joined the WTO,13 driven by
the di¤erent policies undertaken by the Chinese government. These two events mark Chinas
coming to the forefront as an important member in the global economy. Chinas accession to the
WTO implied comprehensive liberalization, some of which would come into e¤ect immediately
whereas others were to be phased in over a period of typically less than three years. Some of
the key components of Chinas accession to the WTO involved:
1. Gradual tari¤ reduction of agricultural and non-agricultural commodities. However the
scope of tari¤ reduction was not massive, only 40% of about 10,000 products at HS8 level
were eligible for tari¤ reductions over a period of ve years with tari¤s for the majority of
the products being reduced by 2005.
13See Figure 1.
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2. Services commitments involving substantial market opening of a broad range of service
sectors, including banking, insurance, telecommunications, and professional services.
3. Phasing out of NTM such as licenses, quota, tendering state trading, export subsidy and
removal of all WTO inconsistent non-tari¤measures (NTMs) by 2005 as well as elimination
of Chinas trade related investment measures (TRIMS).
4. Allowing all rms (whether domestic or foreign) the right to directly import from and
export within three years from accession also providing the right to engage in distribution
of all products in China within three years of accession (except certain extended restrictions
on chemical fertilizers, crude oil, and rened petroleum).
5. The provisions of systemic reforms involved broad reforms in the areas of transparency,
notice and comment, uniform application of laws, and judicial review to help address
barriers to foreign companies doing business in China.
6. China agreed to elimination of state-trading import monopolies for agricultural and indus-
trial products and to the requirement that state-owned enterprises must make purchases
and sales based solely on commercial considerations.
Accession to the WTO signaled credibility to the world that China was open for more foreign
investment and trade. Given the enormous changes that were to take place to facilitate both
foreign investment in China and imports from China to the rest of the world, Chinas accession
to the WTO appears to be a shock of considerable magnitude to the incentive to o¤shore to
China since it created a more conducive trading and business environment. This is the direct
impact of Chinas joining the WTO on the o¤shoring incentive of Danish rms.
The WTO membership for China helped in spearheading further economic reforms, opened
up the Chinese market for more international trade and higher levels of foreign investment,
and opened up the world economy for Chinese exports. This, along with the various structural
changes and liberalization policies adopted by the Chinese government around that time, led to
a surge in Chinas exports soon after it joined WTO. Figure 1 shows that the surge in exports
from China to the rest of the world was largest in 2003 and 2004. Chinas emergence as a major
exporter has an indirect impact on rmsincentive to o¤shore from China from a third party
competition angle. If a rm does not source inputs from China, but its rival rms (either in the
same or a di¤erent country) do and reduce their costs and price, then the rm has to follow suit
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or risk losing market share. Thus, as the rest of the world begins sourcing cheap inputs from
China, we should expect rms in Denmark to behave similarly. One observation of interest is
that though China joined the WTO in December 2001, we see exports increased the most from
China to the rest of the world in 2003 and 2004. Two explanations are, rst, that China had a
transition phase to complete the liberalization, so the initial changes were not large enough to
drive a large increase in exports immediately. Second, a small recession in the world economy
in the post 9/11 crisis dampened the export growth from China in 2002. What is important in
our context is that both these shocks, possibly related, and global in nature, are exogenous to a
small open economy like Denmark and would not be a¤ected by local rm behavior but would
inuence them.
From Figure 2 and Figure 3 we see that Danish rms, both manufacturing and non-manufacturing,
reacted strongly to these episodes in China. Figure 2 shows the growth charts of Danish manu-
facturing imports from top non-EU15 partners and Eastern Europe. Imports from China (CN)
by Danish manufacturing rms take o¤ in 2003 while this is not true from Eastern European
countries. These import responses are consistent with the surge in Chinese world exports.
Figure 3 shows the number of rms (manufacturing and non-manufacturing) importing from
China as share of total rms, from 1999 to 2005. This pattern also holds for the number of rms
importing from China, for example in 2002 both the total number of rms and manufacturing
rms sourcing from China increased sharply, by 37% and 30%, respectively, by far the biggest
increase during 1999-2005. From 2001 to 2005 the number of rms importing from China
increased over two times from about 3000 to 7000, the corresponding numbers for manufacturing
shows an increase by two times approximately from a little less than 500 rms in 2001 to about
a 1000 in 2005 (tables not provided) . The above discussion indicates that Danish rms, both
manufacturing and non-manufacturing, did respond to the shock of Chinas emergence as an
emerging leading exporter following its accession to the WTO.
Because the number of rms sourcing from China has increased dramatically over a few
years, we want to know about the nature of the rms that were sourcing from China before
we see a surge in share of imports from China in 2003. We divide rms into the following four
types: i) rms o¤shoring to China both in 2002 and 1999, ii) rms o¤shoring to China in 2002
but not in 1999, iii) rms o¤shoring to China in 1999 but not in 2002, and iv) rms o¤shoring to
low middle-income countries but not China in 2002 and 1999 and non-o¤shoring rms, for the
year 2002. In Table 2, a comparison of rm characteristics based on the types listed above, show
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that the rms who were sourcing from China in 2002 but not in 1999 (new o¤shoring rms) are
relatively smaller in terms of sales and employment compared to rms who were sourcing from
China in both 1999 and 2002 (existing o¤shoring rms), as well as rms who were o¤shoring
to China only in 1999 but not in 2002 (former o¤shoring rms). The omitted group consists of
rms o¤shoring to low middle-income countries but not China and non o¤shoring rms in 2002
and 1999.
In Table 3a and Table 3b we present the growth rates (annualized) of imports in Danish
manufacturing in 1999-2001 and 2002-2005, respectively. From these tables we see that the
annualized growth rate in overall imports was lower in the 2002-2005 period than in the 1999-2001
period, when considering imports pooled across countries and also when we separate imports
by high and low/middle income countries, except for China. The growth rate of imports from
China was higher in 2002-2005 compared to 1999-2001. Moreover, the growth rate of total
imports from China was 13 times the growth rate of overall imports in 2002-2005. The 1999-
2001 annualized growth rate of overall imports from China was only about twice the growth rate
of total imports. These tables also show the growing importance of Chinese imports in Danish
manufacturing in 2002-2005 compared to 1999-2001. We also decompose the aggregate growth
rate in each column into contributions from consumption goods and intermediate goods based
on the BACI classication of HS6 products into stages of production . When comparing growth
rates for consumption goods and intermediate goods for China with those of all countries (second
column versus third), we again see that the growth rates of each type of good imported from
China compared to other sources was higher in the 2002-2005 period, and of the total import
growth rate 61-75 percent came from rising intermediate imports, the rest from consumption
goods.
Unlike other papers in this literature, we do not restrict o¤shoring to be only intermedi-
ate goods imports for manufacturing rms; consumption goods imports are also considered as
o¤shoring in this paper. In Table 4 and Table 5 we list consumption and intermediate com-
modities, respectively, based on the value imported in 2005 and 2001. Table 4a and Table 5a
list top 20 commodities (based on their value of imports in 2005 in DKK) that are classied as
consumption goods and intermediate goods respectively. For example Table 4a shows that boys
jackets and trousers (HS6 products 620333 and 620343) are among the top products directly
imported by Danish manufacturing rms from China in 2005. We consider this as o¤shoring:
if the rms are making the garment designs in Denmark and producing the garments in China
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and importing them back to Denmark, where they are labeled and packed then it constitutes as
o¤shoring in our context because fragmentation of the production process occurs. Relocating
production to China implies lower production costs, and that is likely to induce skill composition
and rent sharing e¤ects. Moreover many of the food products that are listed as consumption
goods could very well be intermediate inputs in food manufacturing rms. Thus the fact that
surge in imports from China to some extent is driven by consumption goods works well for the
o¤shoring framework we have in mind. Table 6a indicates that most of the increase in Chinese
imports was at the intensive margin; intensive margin being dened as commodities imported
from China in 2002 as well as 1999 at the HS6 product category level.
Finally, Table 6b provides the decomposition by two broad rm categories those importing
from China in 2002 and those not importing from China in 2002 but importing from China
sometime between 2003 and 2005. We see that the former category contributes more towards
the total change in imports from China between 2002-2005 period, mostly through the intensive
margin; for the latter group, the entire change is by denition at the extensive margin.
4.2. Firm Level Average Wage Decomposition. We use the basic statistical framework
of AKM for decomposing information on individual workerswage into individual heterogeneity
and rm heterogeneity. The linear worker-rm regression model of AKM with time-varying rm
e¤ect is
wit = i + xit +  j(i;t) + "it (2)
where i, j, and t are individuals, rms and time respectively. wit is log wage; i is the time-
invariant individual xed e¤ect. xit is a vector of observable time-varying individual characteris-
tics. So these components comprise the skill e¤ect on individual wages.  j(i;t) is the time-varying
rm e¤ect. The function j(i; t) indicates the rm in which worker i is employed in period t.
We allow the rm e¤ect  j(i;t) to vary over time to take into account changes in rms wage
policies in response to trade shocks. "it is the residual, with the identifying assumption that
E["itji; t; x] = 0 and is orthogonal to all other e¤ects in the model.
Following FKV, we now decompose the rm average wage into an average rent sharing
component and an average skill component. The way we do is by subtracting from the variables
their mean across individuals at each point in time. Note from equation 2 that
i = wit   xit    j(i;t)   "it
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Recalling that E("it) = 0, we then dene the mean deviation of i at time t as
~i  i   i = i   E(wit   xit    j(i;t))  "it
The sample analogue of the expression above uses the estimated parameters ^i, ^, and  ^j(i;t)
of equation 2: b~i  wit   xit^    ^j(i;t)   wit   (xit^)   ^j(i;t)
Dene ~sit  sit   st = ~i + xit   xit as the mean deviated value of sit and introduce, as
above, the sample analogue:
~^sit  s^it   s^t = b~i + xit^   xit^
Insert the expression for b~i, reduce, and rearrange. We get the individual mean deviated wage
as:
wit   wt = ~^sit +

 ^j(i;t)    ^t

(3)
Taking the average across individuals within each rm j, we arrive at the split of rm average
wage into an average skill component and a rent sharing component, expressed in values as mean
deviated by individual means at time0@ 1
Njt
NjtX
i=1
wit
1A  wt| {z }
rm avg. wage (deviated)
=
0@ 1
Njt
NjtX
i=1
~^sit
1A
| {z }
avg. skill comp. (deviated)
+

 ^j(t)    ^t

| {z }
rent sharing (devaited)
(4)
Denoting the mean deviated variables at the rm level in equation 4 as yjt = yjt   yt, we now
have the variables wjt, sjt, and  jt. Analogous to equation 2, we can write
 wjt = sjt +  jt
where  indicates the time di¤erence of the variables wjt, sjt, and  jt from year t  1 to year t
(i.e. our di¤erence-in-di¤erences observations of dependent variables in our analysis).
Using these three variables as our dependent variables in di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimations
allows us to break down the coe¢ cient on the treatment dummy in the  wjt-regressions into
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the coe¢ cients of the treatment dummies in the sjt- and  jt-regressions, respectively. Thus,
we track changes in rm average wages and contribute the reason to either skill-compositional
changes, rent-sharing e¤ects from increased protability, or both. Once again we underline
that results from this split leads to completely di¤erent policy conclusions: Skill compositional
changes underline that Danish rms do o¤shore low-skill jobs, but rent sharing e¤ects increase
wage for workers at the Danish rms which adds a positive welfare story to o¤shoring that has
direct positive impact on workers at the rm.
4.3. Estimation Equations:. We test our theoretical motivation that we have boiled down
to equation (1) in section 2, using two types of di¤erence-in-di¤erences (DiD) estimations and
a set of outcome variables. Based on the identication discussion earlier we dene our shock
period to be 2002-2005 and a pre-shock period14 to be 1999-2001. Our DiD equations are:
ykj = +  + d_2002 +Dj + "kj (5)
ykj = + 1d_1999_2002 + 2d_0_2002 + 3d_1999_0 +Dj + "kj (6)
ykj is the change in an outcome variable of interest for rm k in industry j (Dj captures
industry xed e¤ects). We consider the di¤erence over 2002-2005. In equation 5 d_2002 is a
dummy variable for rms o¤shoring to China in 2002. Thus d_2002 is our treatment rms;
control rms (omitted group) are rms who o¤shore to other low-middle income countries but
not China as well as rms that do not source inputs from abroad in 2002.1516
Equation 6 carries out di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates by rm types, depending on when
they were o¤shoring to China prior to 2003. As mentioned in the data section, the types that
we consider are: d_1999_2002, rms sourcing from China in both 1999 and 2002; d_0_2002,
rms o¤shoring to China in 2002 but not in 1999; d_1999_0, rms o¤shoring to China in 1999
but not in 2002. The omitted group is non-o¤shoring rms and rms not o¤shoring to China
but other low middle income countries. The main outcome variables of interest are 1) rm level
average wage, 2) skill composition, and 3) rent sharing. All results in the next section use Danish
manufacturing rms only (NACE 15-36).
14To test for trend di¤erences in a DiDiD.
15Results are similar using other treatment and control group. See Section 6 on robustness.
16We do not include rms importing from high income countries in our control group because the products
they import might not be comparable to those obtained from low/middle income countries in terms of price and
quality.
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We carry out all estimations following two parallel tracks: One track utilizing only typical
rm level information, and a second track making full use of the worker-rm matched data.
Comparing these two approaches demonstrates the fruitfulness of having worker-rm matched
data even though the scope is rm level analyses.
5. Results
5.1. Estimating Results from Firm Level Data. We begin by looking at rm level
variables before decomposing rm level average wages into skill composition and rent sharing
components from worker level regression. Typically, rm level datasets give skill ratio (skilled
vs. unskilled), sales per employee (rent sharing). Apart from gauging the impact of the shock on
various rm level outcomes, this exercise allows us to compare our results obtained from using
more nuanced measures of skill composition and rent sharing e¤ects by taking full advantage
of linked worker-rm information with those that are commonly used in the literature and
readily available in typical rm level datasets. The skill ratio that we use in this section is the
traditional measure based on education of the employee; skilled labor being those having more
than high school education and unskilled are those with high school or less than high school
level of education.
Table 7 shows the estimation of equation 5. From columns 1 and 3 we see that average wage
and skill ratio di¤erentials changes are 1.5% and 3.6%, respectively, higher for rms o¤shoring
to China in 2002 compared to the control group. Columns 2 and 5 indicate that employment
and sales di¤erentials are 6.2% and 5.1%, respectively, less for rms o¤shoring to China in 2002
compared to those who were not. The sales gure that we have represents export and domestic
sales of the rm from Denmark, so one possible reason for negative di¤erential increase in
the value of sales17 could be due to reduction of prices of commodities through reducing cost
by o¤shoring to China.18 Interestingly, there is no statistically signicant change in sales per
employee. If sales per employee is taken as a proxy for revenue based rent sharing then this
result indicates that skill composition is the only channel through which wages are a¤ected,
due to o¤shoring, between treatment and control rms in this period. Column 6 indicates that
imports as share of sales (o¤shoring) are 1% higher for treatment rms than for control rms
during the 2002-2005 time period, showing that Danish rms o¤shoring to China in 2002 are
17 I.e. treatment rm sales increase less from 2002 to 2005 than control rm sales do. Recall these are di¤erence
in di¤erences in sales.
18 It can also be o¤shore exports to third-party country.
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better able to take advantage of the liberalized business environment change in China and hence
fall in cost of o¤shoring to China.19Moreover, though Chinese trade has become important for
Denmark over the years, it constitutes about 5% of manufacturing imports.
Since the number of rms importing from China has increased over the years we carry out the
di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimation over 2002-2005 by breaking down types of rms depending
on when they were o¤shoring to China and see if any di¤erential results emerge among the types
of rms. Table 8 shows our ndings; the types we are interested here are rms o¤shoring to
China both in 2002 and 1999; rms o¤shoring to China in 2002 but not in 1999; rms o¤shoring
to China in 1999 but not in 2002; rms o¤shoring to low middle-income countries but not China
and non-importing rms (the omitted group).
Results in Table 8 show that rms o¤shoring to China in 2002 but not in 1999 experience
the highest di¤erential wage increases. Firms present in China in both 1999 and 2002 also show
increase in average domestic wages in this period but less than rms new to sourcing inputs
from China. Similarly, the change in employment is stronger for the rms newly o¤shoring
to China. Just as in Table 7, column 4 in Table 8 indicates no di¤erential labor productivity
(sales-per-employee) changes between the di¤erent types of rms in the 2002-2005 period.
Because Chinas joining the WTO was anticipated, we may worry that our treatment rms
are responding to the shock by changing their technology before 2002 to take better advantage
of cheaper Chinese resources. The ndings in Table 8 alleviate that worry. Though the ac-
cession was anticipated, there was quite a lot of uncertainty in Denmark about the suitability
of o¤shoring to China, apart from the various restrictions that were not to be dismantled till
after China joined WTO. Likely, this uncertainty prevented rms from increasing the level of
o¤shoring to China in anticipation of the future changes. Hence, although rms could fore-
see new o¤shoring opportunities due to long drawn WTO negotiations, it is unlikely that they
could take advantage of it before the liberalizations came into e¤ect. The results in column (6)
provides support to this idea; since the change in o¤shoring was higher for the two types of
rms importing from China in 2002,20 compared to the omitted group, we can conclude that
19The control group includes non-o¤shoring rms, inating the e¤ect if they do not choose to o¤shore during
the period. On the other hand, some of them could choose to o¤shore in 2003, 2004 or 2005, which could imply
arbitrarily large jumps in import shares (from zero to something) compared to the treatment rms that mostly
o¤shored to somewhere else than China at the beginning of 2002. Thus, presence of non-o¤shoring rms in the
control group could also understate the e¤ect. However, excluding these (few) non-importing manufacturers does
not change results much. Thus, for consistency we decide to stick to the same sample as for the other estimations
in Table 7.
20 i.e. rms continuing o¤shoring from China, and rm new to o¤shoring from China.
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both types of o¤shoring rms responded to the shocks by increasing the share of imports from
China in the 2002-2005 period. The results in this table also indicate that the wage increases
we witness in Table 7 are most pronounced for the rms that decide to o¤shore to China around
2002. This nding coupled with results in descriptive statistics in Table 2 lends support to the
idea that Chinas accession to the WTO and the soon after surge in Chinese exports was more
important for the relatively smaller and less productive rms who could not take advantage of
Chinese imports prior to 2002 because of restrictive business environment in China; they began
o¤shoring to China once China joined the WTO and also saw a surge in exports soon after.
To ensure that the results observed in Table 7 and Table 8 are indeed driven by the shock
and not by di¤erential trend between the more productive treatment rms compared to the less
productive control rms, we need to check that the observed change in the outcome variable
was greater during the period 2002-2005 than in other periods.
We consider the pre-shock period 1999-2001. We estimate an equation similar to equation
6, taking the di¤erence in the change in the outcome variable of interest over 2002-2005 from
1999-2001 and regressing it on the three types of rm dummies. This essentially leads to a
triple-di¤erences strategy which purges any di¤erential trend for the rms. Results in Table 9
indicate that the di¤erential change in average wage is the largest for rms new to o¤shoring
from China in 2002 (d_0_2002). Average wage changed 3.6% more for these rms in the 2002-
2005 period than in the 1999-2001 period compared to control rms. Skill ratio changes though
positive are not signicant. Di¤erential change in sales per employee (column 4) between the
two periods is not signicant either for the new o¤shoring rms (d_0_2002) compared to the
omitted group. To sum up, though we nd that events in China caused di¤erential outcomes
in 2002-2005 between treatment and control rms over and above their basic underlying trend
di¤erences, using crude proxies for skill composition and rent sharing cannot explain what is
driving the observed di¤erential wage increase. Since skill includes much more than education
and rent sharing might not just mean sharing revenue, we now use information on workerswage
histories in our worker-rm data to construct more rigorous measures of skill composition and
rent sharing e¤ects.
5.2. Estimating the E¤ects from a Worker-Firm Regression. We rst estimate a
standard AKM-type model (equation 2) with time-varying rm e¤ects. The inclusion of time
varying rm e¤ects allows us to address changes in rm wage policies following trade shocks.
As time varying returns to individuals we include linear and quadratic terms for experience and
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age, and education (high skill: tertiary education; medium skill: vocational education; omitted
group: high school or less). Table 10 shows the estimates from our worker-rm regression. As
expected, more years of experience are associated with higher wages and there are diminishing
returns to experience. Similar results are also true for age. Unsurprisingly, high skilled workers
and medium skilled workers earn more than low or unskilled workers.
We then estimate the e¤ect of the shock on rm level average wage through the two ef-
fects constructed from the worker-rm regression using estimation equations 5 and 6. Table 11
presents results for di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates for equation 5 over the 2002-2005 period.
In this section we now nd that average wages (deviated from annual mean) increased 1.2%
more for rms o¤shoring to China in 2002 than control rms and both skill composition and
rent sharing are responsible for this increase both signicant at the 10% level. Skill compo-
sition increased 0.3% more for rms o¤shoring to China in 2002 and explains about 25% of
the wage increase. Rent sharing increased 0.9% more for rms o¤shoring to China in 2002 and
accounts for as much as 75% of the wage increase.
To ensure that the di¤erence we observe is driven by the shock, we carry out a triple dif-
ferences estimation similar to Table 9, by regressing the changes in our outcome variables of
interest (rm level average wage, skill composition and rent sharing deviated from their respec-
tive annual means) between 2002-2005 and 1999-2001 periods, on the di¤erent rm dummies.
The results for wages corroborate what we found earlier. Table 12 shows signicant (at 10%-
level) di¤erential wage gains for rms new to o¤shoring from China (d_0_2002). Now we can
say what is driving that wage di¤erential: rent sharing only. Interestingly, for rms o¤shoring
to China in both 1999 and 2002, the di¤erential gain in wages between the two periods is ex-
plained more by skill composition e¤ect rent sharing though positive is insignicant. For rms
o¤shoring to China only before 2002, all the outcome variables have negative sign, though none
are signicant. The fact that wages increased di¤erentially for the rms o¤shoring to China
in 2002 is in line with the underlying theory. Moreover, we arrive at the apparent puzzle: the
mechanisms behind the di¤erential wage increase between the two periods (2002-2005 and 1999-
2001) is di¤erent for relatively the smaller rms o¤shoring to China in 2002 but not in 1999 and
relatively larger rms o¤shoring to China in both 2002 and 1999. A glance at our data in Table
2 shows that the rms o¤shoring to China in 2002 and not in 1999 (d_0_2002) are smaller than
rms o¤shoring to China in both 1999 and 2002 (d_1999_2002). Thus, the former rms are
likely to have more homogeneous workers in terms of skill over the years and that could explain
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why their di¤erential change in skill composition between the two periods is small. Bigger rms
continuing to o¤shore to China are likely to have more diverse workforce hence their wage in-
crease is accounted for by both mechanisms. Again, comparing results in Table 9 and Table 12
suggest that using measures of skill composition and rent sharing using worker-rm matched
data allows us to take into account aspects of average wage determination that is not captured
by traditional measures of skill based on education and rent sharing based on revenue sharing.
5.3. Robustness Check. In this section we carry out di¤erent robustness tests to strengthen
our main results.
As a rst check we re-estimate our main equation using alternate rm dummies, to see
whether there was any di¤erential wage e¤ect for rms who began o¤shoring from China between
2003-2005, though their decision to do so was possibly endogenous. The rm types that we
consider are d_2002: rms o¤shoring to China in 2002; d_2003_2005: rms o¤shoring to
China after 2002, i.e. sometime in 2003-2005 period but not doing so in 2002; the omitted group
are rms not o¤shoring to China between 2002-2005 but o¤shoring to other low-middle income
countries and non-o¤shoring rms. Table 13 provides qualitatively similar results for the rms
o¤shoring to China in 2002 (d_2002firms) as found in Table 11. Both skill composition and
rent sharing e¤ects explain the higher change in wages and the latter channel explains more
of the increase for these rms. We also see that there are wage gains for rms o¤shoring to
China after 2002 (d_2003_2005 rms), mostly via the skill composition e¤ect, so rms that
began o¤shoring to China later have also gained. Table 14 presents a triple di¤erences estimate
by comparing the di¤erential change in the change in our outcome variables of interest over
1999-2001 period and 2002-2005 period. The results indicate that there are di¤erential gains in
wages between the two periods for both types of rms, and both channels matter.
We carry out our main estimation using manufacturing rms only. We re-run the main
estimations with all rms: manufacturing, services and retail/wholesale rms. The reason is
twofold. First, our data reveals that rms switch status over the years; so a manufacturing rm
might become a service or retail rm by o¤shoring its manufacturing operations. These rms
would drop from our manufacturing sample and thus might lead to under-estimation of the
e¤ects of o¤shoring on our variables of interest. Second, the impact of the shock was also very
pronounced for non-manufacturing rms as discussed in section 4.1. The results, displayed in
Table 15, are consistent with our main results presented in Table 10, though coe¢ cient estimates
are now larger. We see there was wage gain for rms o¤shoring to China in 2002, and relatively
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more of that increase is explained through rent sharing. Triple di¤erences estimation results in
Table 16 again show that most of the di¤erential increase is for the rms importing from China
in 2002 but not 1999, but now only skill composition e¤ects signicantly explain that increase,
and just roughly half of the di¤erential gain. The other half cannot signicantly be attributed
rent sharing. There is also di¤erential increase in wages observed for the rms importing from
China in 2002 and in 1999, and that increase is still explained only through the skill composition
e¤ect and completely dominate the total e¤ect on average wages.
What if the e¤ects we see are not from the rmsnew activities in China but instead from
o¤shoring to other, similar countries? That is a very relevant concern. We have run our pro-
cedures on other similar countries and former Eastern European countries among which many
are now part of the EU and not low-income countries anymore. We nd no results. Recall that
we have a well-sustained argument for an unanticipated shock for Danish rms, particularly for
small rms even though Chinas accession was anticipated. In fact, running our regressions on
a subsample of small rms 10-50 employees show even stronger average e¤ects. We see no
other shocks of arguably same scale. The case of the Czech Republic demonstrates nicely why
e¤ects must come from Chinas accession to the WTO acting as an unanticipated shock: very
few of the treatment rms also o¤shore to the Czech Republic. The reason is that many of the
rms are relatively new to o¤shoring and have few common source countries apart from China
(see Table 18).
In 2005, growth in imports from Eastern European countries starts to pick up lowering the
ratio of China imports relative to Eastern Europe import to 1.7.21 To exclude this possible source
of gains from o¤shoring to countries other than China from our results on the treated groups we
run the estimations with the shock period dened as 2002 to 2004 instead of 2002 to 2005. Our
qualitative results hold and estimates are perhaps contrary to ones a priori beliefs generally
higher (see Table 19). Combined with the robustness check from other countries just discussed
above in this section, we are condent that our results stem from the opening up of China as
a sourcing destination and the dominating shock for our treatment groups. We do still refer to
the results based on 2002-2005 as our main results because growth in imports from China still
dominates any other sourcing destination in 2005 and thus dene by when imports from China
in an absolute amount truly takes o¤.
21The ratio ranges between 1.7 and 10 during the period 2002 to 2005, cf. Figure 2
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6. Conclusion
This paper uses rich linked worker-rm data from Denmark to address how o¤shoring a¤ects
rm level average wage. We use Chinas accession to the WTO in December 2001 and the boom
in Chinese exports soon after, as an exogenous shock to the incentive to o¤shore to China by
Danish rms. This shock allows us to identify the causal e¤ect of o¤shoring on wages.
Unlike other papers in this literature, we consider di¤erent possible channelsnamely skill
composition and rent sharing e¤ectsto explain o¤shoring induced gains in rm average wages.
A skill composition e¤ect increases average wage if rms send low-skilled jobs abroad retaining
high skilled workers at home who require higher pay. A rent sharing e¤ect increases average
wage if rms share o¤shoring induced increase in prots with all existing worker. Our ndings
show that rms sourcing from China in 2002 had higher increase in average wages between
2002 and 2005 compared to the control group.22 We nd that both skill composition and rent
sharing e¤ects signicantly matter in explaining the wage gain. Moreover, it is important to
separate out the e¤ects of the two channels since they have di¤erent policy implications. While
the presence of the skill composition e¤ects does underline that Danish rms o¤shore certain
jobs, the presence of the rent sharing e¤ect highlights that rms o¤shoring to China also enjoy
increased protability and share that with employees. The important result to highlight here is
that the timing of when a rm is exposed to a shock to the incentive to o¤shore matters. In our
case: Firms present in China before Chinas accession to the WTO in December 2001 o¤shored
jobs using relatively unskilled labor. Whereas, rms not present in China before the time of
accession increased protability and shared these increases with their employees, thus pointing to
increased welfare. These rms however did not o¤shore relatively more any particular skill type
of job. One possible explanation for this could be the size di¤erence of the two types of rms and
hence their workforce composition. Smaller manufacturing rms (less than thirty employees) are
likely to have more homogeneous workforce and for them the average skill level of the workers
might not change much over the years. Bigger rms already o¤shoring to China are likely to
have more diverse workforce and hence for them both composition and rent sharing matter for
the wage increase. However, the skill composition e¤ect signicantly explains about half that
gain while the other half explained by the rent sharing e¤ect is not statistically signicant.
Though we carry out estimations at the rm level, we fully utilize the worker-rm match
data. Following Frias, Kaplan & Verhoogen (2012) we decompose the e¤ects on average wages
22Firms o¤shoring to low middle income countries but not China and non-o¤shoring rms.
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into estimated e¤ects due to skill composition changes and changes due to rent sharing. We
compare these results with results obtained using measures of skill composition and rent sharing
available from typical rm level data. We show that using linked worker-rm data allows us
added insight behind the wage increase mechanism because, in our case, the two sets of results
do not conform; ratio of educated to uneducated workers as a traditional measure for skill
composition and sales per employee as a measure of rent sharing cannot explain the average
wage increase. Our measure of composition and rent sharing constructed from the worker level
wage regression of the AKM type do.
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Appendix
Table 1: Comparison of manufacturing rm characteristics
between o¤shoring and non-o¤shoring rms in 2005
All firms Offshoring firms
Non-offshoring
firms
Regr. Mean
difference
No. of firms 5281 3007 2274
Means
Log (employees) 3,41 3,78 2,93 0.85***
(1) (1,09) (0,56) (0,02)
Log (sales) 17,05 17,70 16,19 1.20***
(1,36) (1,31) (0,87) (0,03)
Skill ratio, edu/non-edu 3,65 3,76 3,50 0.26**
(3,88) (4,15) (3,47) (0,11)
Log (EBIT per worker) 10,83 11,08 10,51 0.36***
(1,1) (1,12) (0,99) (0,04)
Log (hourly wage) 5,20 5,25 5,14 0.06***
(0,19) (0,17) (0,21) (0,01)
Note: Educated (edu.) means have more than high school education and non-educated (no edu.) refers to less than or equal to
twelve years of education. The last column gives difference in the means between offshoring and non-offshoring firms; all
regressions include industry fixed effect and employment is included as additional control in all regressions except
log(employees).
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Figure 1: Chinese Exports in Billions of US Dollars
Source:
Figure 2: Danish manufacturing imports (in logs) from
selected partners and groups of partners
Note: Growth rates of imports from China are between two and ten times the growth rates of
imports from Eastern Europe between 2002 and 2005.
Source: External rm level trade statistics, Statistics Denmark, own calculations
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Figure 3: Share of Danish Firms Sourcing from China
Source: External rm level trade statistics, Statistics Denmark, own calculations
Note: Values on left hand axis relate to share of all rms importing from China. Values related to
share of manufacturing rms importing from China are on the right hand axis.
Table 2: Comparison of rm characteristic by type in 2002
wage sales/emp sales emp
Existing Offshoring
Firms
0.082*** 0.621*** 2.18*** 1.56***
(0.012) (0.041) (0.112) (0.096)
New Offshoring
Firms
0.049*** 0.55*** 1.88*** 1.33***
(0.016) (0.054) (0.128) (0.116)
Former Offshoring
Firms
0.084*** 0.682*** 2.12*** 1.44***
(0.03) (0.143) (0.251) (0.235)
N 3336 3337 3337 3337
Note: Robust standard error in the parenthesis. All regression includes industry fixed effects. The omitted group is firms not
offshoring to China but offshoring to other low-middle income countries and non-offshoring firms in 1999/2002.
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Table 3: Import growth contributions
Table3a: Import growth contributions (annualized) in per cent of base total (1999-2001)
All China Low/med income High income
Consumption 2.1 6.2 3.1 2.0
Intermediate 8.6 18.2 12.7 8.3
Total 10.7 24.4 15.8 10.3
Source: External firm level trade statistics, Statistics Denmark, own calculations
Notes: Classification of consumption goods and intermediate goods follow the BACI classification from CEPII. Low/med
income group excludes China.
Table 3b: Import growth contributions (annualized) in per cent of base total (2002-2005)
All China Low/med income High income
Consumption 0.1 10.5 -1.7 0.1
Intermediate 2.0 17.0 12.1 1.1
Total 2.1 27.5 10.3 1.2
Source: External firm level trade statistics, Statistics Denmark, own calculations
Notes: Classification of consumption goods and intermediate goods follow the BACI classification from CEPII. Low/med
income group excludes China.
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Table 4: Ranking Imported Consumption Products
Table 4a: HS6 Manufacturing imported consumption goods 2005 2002
Rank
in 2002
160540 Crustaceans nes, prepared or preserved 53340799 1311804 52
711719 Imitation jewellery nes of base metal including plate 43417328 9816229 6
940360 Furniture, wooden, nes 38544723 1117227 61
030420 Fish fillets, frozen 33941755 3303811 23
620333 Mens, boys jackets, blazers, synthetic fibre, not kni 33804627 179689 152
620343 Mens, boys trousers shorts, synthetic fibre, not knit 32858528 12386218 4
392690 Plastic articles nes 26146710 17187523 2
940179 Seats with metal frames, nes 24050163 908627 75
950390 Toys nes 23540912 5684666 15
940490 Articles of bedding nes 21799778 8238720 9
630790 Made up articles (textile) nes, textile dress pattern 21016679 8610865 8
490199 Printed reading books, except dictionaries etc 20984376 7848889 10
940140 Seats convertible into beds 20758743 10773086 5
902190 Orthopaedic appliances, nes 18376033 4452192 19
950330 Construction sets and constructional toys, nes 17444588 1008915 67
620332 Mens, boys jackets & blazers, of cotton, not knit 16619985 370365 122
940161 Seats with wooden frames, upholstered nes 16251353 600429 92
620462 Womens, girls trousers & shorts, of cotton, not knit 13046353 853358 77
851629 Electric space heating nes and soil heating apparatus 12438464
611030 Pullovers, cardigans etc of manmade fibres, knit 10878943 1957272 37
Table 4b: HS6 Manufacturing imported consumption goods 2001 1999
Rank
in 1999
850980 Domestic appliances, with electric motor, nes 25840768
392690 Plastic articles nes 18687247 6150690 12
610711 Mens, boys underpants or briefs, of cotton, knit 16505069 18054200 3
030420 Fish fillets, frozen 14937704 136284 146
620343 Mens, boys trousers shorts, synthetic fibre, not knit 14733910 2602090 23
902190 Orthopaedic appliances, nes 12922589 6737316 9
950330 Construction sets and constructional toys, nes 11641092 3671195 19
040900 Honey, natural 9237678 4331478 18
030619 Crustaceans nes, frozen, 9110324 6118847 13
420231 Articles for pocket or handbag, leather outer surface 8706212 4630337 16
841840 Freezers of the upright type, < 900 litre capacity 8292136 1909480 33
940490 Articles of bedding nes 8131019 11693002 5
420292 Containers nes, outer surface plastic or textile 7603965 921955 51
950390 Toys nes 7148450 2346638 26
821599 Cutlery not in sets, not plated with precious metal 6836842 5752128 14
630790 Made up articles (textile) nes, textile dress pattern 6714122 21671684 2
640291 Boots, soles/uppers rubber or plastic, over ankle, ne 6486472
611090 Pullovers, cardigans etc of material nes knit 6417276 611280 67
490199 Printed reading books, except dictionaries etc 5820386 6725830 10
660110 Garden and similar umbrellas 5793580 2503043 24
Source: External rm level trade statistics, Statistics Denmark, own calculations
Notes: Amounts are in DKK. . Classication of consumption goods and intermediate goods follow
the BACI classication from CEPII. Rank gives the position of the commodity in DKK in the year
2002 and 1999.
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Table 5: Ranking Imported Intermediate Products
Table 5a: HS6 Manufacturing imported intermediate goods 2005 2002
Rank in
2002
848180 Taps, cocks, valves and similar appliances, nes 126744085 31182357 9
870839 Brake system parts except linings for motor vehicles 107457536 34315 307
848190 Parts of taps, cocks, valves or similar appliances 99517689 71550756 2
853400 Electronic printed circuits 82899720 39798006 6
732510 Cast articles, of non-malleable cast iron nes 62931197 1049846 103
841391 Parts of pumps for liquids 49542779 44151963 5
730723 Pipe fittings, butt welding of stainless steel 47028226 10519817 23
350790 Enzymes nes, prepared enzymes nes, except rennet 45636175 20757774 15
940390 Furniture parts nes 40444629 5836004 32
852990 Parts for radio/tv transmit/receive equipment, nes 39835005 3784459 50
852190 Video record/reproduction apparatus not magnetic tape 36282907 2326 419
730890 Structures and parts of structures, iron or steel, ne 29505922 5427577 35
851890 Parts of non-recording electronic equipment 27387806 27234039 12
901920 Therapeutic respiration apparatus 27136114 3227836 54
848130 Valves, check 26261257 3844912 48
840999 Parts for diesel and semi-diesel engines 26028088 1760985 76
852090 Audio recording equipment without sound reproduction 25299813 4917146 39
850431 Transformers electric, power capacity < 1 KVA, nes 22112709 29551079 10
850440 Static converters, nes 20603780 54295373 4
853690 Electrical switch, protector, connecter for < 1kV nes 18316477 2005028 72
Table 5b: HS6 Manufacturing imported intermediate goods 2001 1999
Rank in
1999
851822 Multiple loudspeakers, mounted in single enclosure 114262840 32312257 6
760429 Bars, rods and other profiles, aluminium alloyed 67087534
841391 Parts of pumps for liquids 56487117 29320032 7
853400 Electronic printed circuits 40652653 3689736 33
851890 Parts of non-recording electronic equipment 35982391 6541136 22
848180 Taps, cocks, valves and similar appliances, nes 34947270 150615 136
848190 Parts of taps, cocks, valves or similar appliances 33820169 5482547 23
851829 Loudspeakers, nes 28085847 343302 103
850431 Transformers electric, power capacity < 1 KVA, nes 27948139 586888 91
730729 Pipe fittings of stainless steel except butt welding 26270529 46720486 3
392340 Plastic spools, cops, bobbins and similar supports 26226470 32682536 5
293627 Vitamin C, derivatives, unmixed 23789420 21150890 8
121230 Apricot, peach and plum stones & kernels, human food 17860915 8777163 16
680100 Stone setts, curbstones, flagstones (except slate) 17197610 3743352 32
854441 Electric conductors, nes < 80 volts, with connectors 16348712 888264 74
902140 Hearing aids, except parts and accessories 16298009 33694520 4
871491 Bicycle frames and forks, and parts thereof 14209632 7315550 19
852290 Parts and accessories of recorders except cartridges 13885985
900190 Prisms, mirrors and optical elements nes, unmounted 11352433 4741506 28
940520 Electric table, desk, bedside and floor lamps 10565394 566506 92
Source: External rm level trade statistics, Statistics Denmark, own calculations
Notes: Amounts are in DKK. . Classication of consumption goods and intermediate goods follow
the BACI classication from CEPII. Rank gives the position of the commodity in DKK in the year
2002 and 1999.
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Table 6: Decomposing imports
Table 6a: Decomposing imports from China (2002-2005)
Change Margin shares of trade increase
(M DKR) Extensive Intensive
Consumption 489 25% 75%
Intermediate 795 37% 63%
Total 1284 32% 68%
Source: External firm level trade statistics, Statistics Denmark, own calculations
Notes: Classification of consumption goods and intermediate goods follow the BACI classification from CEPII. Low/med
income group excludes China.
Table 6b: Decomposing imports from China (2002-2005) by rm types
Firms Offshoring to China in
2002
Firms offshoring to China in
2003- 2005
Change
Margin shares of
trade increase Change
Margin shares of trade
increase
(M DKR) Extensive Intensive
(M
DKR) Extensive Intensive
Consumption 350 30% 70% 139 100% 0
Intermediate 426 39% 61% 369 100% 0
Total 776 35% 65% 508 100% 0
Source: External firm level trade statistics, Statistics Denmark, own calculations
Notes: Classification of consumption goods and intermediate goods follow the BACI classification from CEPII. Last column
contains firms offshoring to China in 2003-2005 period but not 2002.
Table 7: Di¤erence-in-di¤erence Estimate (2002-2005)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Δl(avgwage) Δemp Δsk_ratio Δ(sales/emp) Δsales Δoffshore
Offshoring in 2002
0.015*** -0.062*** 0.036*** 0.011 -0.051** 0.010***
(0.005) (0.018) (0.011) (0.020) (0.023) (0.002)
N 2119 2119 2119 2119 2119 2119
Note: Robust standard error in the parenthesis. All regression includes industry fixed effects. ***,**,* indicate significance
at 1,5,10 percent levels respectively. Dependent variable is differenced over 2002-2005 period.
Table 8: Di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimate by rm types (2002-2005)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Δ l(avgwage) Δ emp Δ sk_ratio Δ sales/emp Δ sales Δoffshore
Existing Offshoring
Firms
0.015** -0.087*** 0.048** 0.003 -0.084** 0.02***
(0.006) (0.027) (0.020) (0.028) (0.036) (0.005)
New Offshoring
Firms
0.027*** -0.154*** 0.041* 0.005 -0.148*** 0.013***
(0.009) (0.038) (0.022) (0.040) (0.050) (0.004)
Former Offshoring
Firms
0.003 -0.133 0.006 -0.061 -0.195*** 0.004
(0.016) (0.092) (0.033) (0.106) (0.067) (0.002)
N 1915 1915 1761 1915 1915 1915
Note: Robust standard error in the parenthesis. All regressions include industry fixed effects. ***,**,* indicate
significance at 1,5,10 percent levels respectively.
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Table 9: Triple Di¤erence Estimate by Firm Types
1 2 3 4 5 6
Δ l(avgwage) Δ emp Δ sk_ratio Δ sales/emp Δ sales Δoffshore
Existing
Offshoring Firms
0.007 -0.035 0.019 0.000 -0.035 0.018***
(0.009) (0.036) (0.017) (0.038) (0.046) (0.006)
New Offshoring
Firms
0.036*** -0.134*** 0.013 0.019 -0.116* 0.014***
(0.012) (0.045) (0.021) (0.059) (0.068) (0.005)
Former Offshoring
Firms
0.002 -0.084 -0.008 -0.172 -0.255*** 0.022**
(0.022) (0.106) (0.040) (0.133) (0.096) (0.01)
N 1293 1293 1293 1293 1293 1293
Note: Robust standard error in the parenthesis. ***,**,* indicate significance at 1,5,10 percent levels respectively.
Table 10: Worker Level Wage Regression
age age2 experience experience2 high_sk med_sk
log wage 0.041*** -.0003*** 0.010*** -0.0003*** 0.460*** 0.395***
(0.0004) (0.000) (.0003) (0.000) (.0106) (.007)
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis estimated with 50 bootstrap replications, clustering at level of individuals. The
regression includes time fixed effects. ***,**,* indicate significance at 1,5,10 percent levels respectively. Number of
observations 1106744.
Table 11: Di¤erence-in-di¤erence Estimate Using Measures
Constructed from Worker Level Wage Regression (2002-2005)
1 2 3
Δ avg(lwage) Δ sk_comp Δ rent_sh
Offshoring in 2002
0.012** 0.003* 0.009**
(0.005) (0.002) (0.004)
N 1742 1742 1742
Note: Robust standard errors in the parenthesis. All regression includes industry fixed effects. **,**,* indicate significance
at 1,5,10 percent levels respectively.
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Table 12: Triple Di¤erence Estimate Using Measures Constructed
from Worker Level Wage Regression by Firm Types
1 2 3
Δ avg(lwage) Δ sk_comp Δ rent_sh
Existing Offshoring
Firms
0.012* 0.008* 0.005
(0.007) (0.004) (0.008)
New Offshoring
Firms
0.018* 0.001 0.017*
(0.01) (0.005) (0.01)
Former Offshoring
Firms
-0.027 -0.019 -0.008
(0.024) (0.02) (0.015)
N 1272 1272 1272
Note: Robust standard error in the parenthesis. ***,**,* indicate significance at 1,5,10 percent levels respectively.
Table 13: Di¤erence-in-Di¤erence Estimate Using Alternate Firm Types (2002-2005)
1 2 3
Δ avg(lwage) Δ sk_comp Δ rent_sh
Offshoring in
2002
0.013** 0.005* 0.008*
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
Offshoring after
2002
0.011* 0.002 0.009*
(0.007) (0.004) (0.006)
N 1742 1742 1742
Note: Robust standard error in the parenthesis. All regression includes industry fixed effects. ***,**,* indicate significance
at 1,5,10 percent levels respectively.
Table 14: Triple Di¤erence Estimate Using Alternate Firm Types
1 2 3
Δ avg(lwage) Δ sk_comp Δ rent_sh
Offshoring in
2002
0.016** 0.007** 0.009*
(0.007) (0.004) (0.006)
Offshoring after
2002
0.017* 0.009* 0.008
(0.010) (0.005) (0.009)
N 1483 1483 1483
Note: Robust standard error in the parenthesis. ***,**,* indicate significance at 1,5,10 percent levels respectively.
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Table 15: Di¤erence-in-Di¤erence Estimate Using Manufacturing and
Non-Manufacturing Firms (2002-2005)
1 2 3
Δ avg(lwage) Δ sk_comp Δ rent_sh
Offshoring in
2002
0.018*** 0.005* 0.013***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
N 6253 6253 6253
Note: Robust standard error in the parenthesis. All regression includes industry fixed effects. ***,**,* indicate significance
at 1,5,10 percent levels respectively.
Table 16: Triple Di¤erence Estimate Using Manufacturing and
Non-Manufacturing Firm
1 2 3
Δ avg(lwage) Δ sk_comp Δ rent_sh
Existing Offshoring
Firms
0.01* 0.012** -0.002
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
New Offshoring
Firms
0.02** 0.012* 0.009
(0.01) (0.007) (0.08)
Former Offshoring
Firms
-0.026* -0.013 -0.013
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
N 6808 6808 6808
Note: Robust standard error in the parenthesis. ***,**,* indicate significance at 1,5,10 percent levels respectively
Table 17: Firm share of imports coming from China (CN)
between 1999 and 2005
No. of
firms* 1999 2001 2002 2005
Firms not present in CN in 2002 402 16% 10% 15%
Firms not present in CN in 2002 but not in 1999 294 5% 6% 13%
Firms present in CN in 2002 1803 16% 17% 15% 22%
Firms present in CN before, in, and after 2002 805 16% 20% 20% 26%
Firms present before 2002 and again in 2005 45 11% 4% 8%
* Based on 2002
Source: Statistic Denmark’s firm level external trade statistics, own calculations
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Table 18: Danish rms importing from China (CN) and the Czech Republic (CZ)
Number of manufacturing firms Imports from China.. Imports from CZ..
..in total ..and not CZ ..in total ..and not CN
Importers in 2002 3995 3391 1637 287
Importers in 2005 7033 6539 872 98
Not importing from either two in 2002 3015 3015
New to import from source 3038 580 -765 14
Source: Statistic Denmark’s firm level external trade statistics, own calculations
Table 19: Using 2002-2004 as the shock period (triple di¤erence estimates
comparable with the main results of Table 12)
Δ avg(lwage) Δ sk_comp Δ rent_sh
Existing Offshoring
Firms
0.014* 0.006 0.008
(0.007) (0.004) (0.007)
New Offshoring
Firms
0.0192* 0.001 0.018*
(0.01) (0.005) (0.09)
Former Offshoring
Firms
-0.027 -0.015 -0.005
(0.024) (0.02) (0.016)
N 1360 1360 1360
Note: Robust standard error in the parenthesis. ***,**,* indicate significance at 1,5,10 percent levels respectively.
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Chapter 3
Exporter Price Response to Exchange Rate Changes
by
Henrik Barslund Fosse
Abstract: Firms exporting to foreign markets face a particular challenge: to price their
exports in a foreign market when the exchange rate changes. This paper takes on pricing-
to-market using a unique data set that covers rm level monthly trade at great detail. As
opposed to annual trade ows, monthly trade ows bring us closer to the transaction level
where rm decisions are actually made. I nd that the utilization of monthly data does add new
information about the average level of pricing-to-market, and the di¤erences between long-run
pricing-to-market and short-run pricing-to-market. Furthermore, I nd industry di¤erences in
pricing-to-market in terms of the magnitude (zero to complete pricing-to-market) and the timing
(when do rms changes prices), and that prcing-to-market is stronger on high-income markets.
As discussed in detail in the paper, all results are in-line with predictions of several theoretical
contributions to the litterature on pricing-to-market and exchange rate pass-through.
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1. Introduction
Firms exporting to foreign markets face a particular challenge: to price their exports in a foreign
market when the exchange rate changes. These export sales are inuenced when the exchange
rate changes and thus adjusting prices in response to these changes is crucial. If rms respond to
uctuations in foreign currencies by changing their export prices, we say that rms are pricing-
to-market (PTM). Whether rms adjust prices or not, and by how much, depends on a range
of circumstances, and in particular how competitive product markets are. The discussion of
PTM relates to the long-standing literature on incomplete exchange rate pass-through1 that is
concerned with why import prices do not fully adjust to exchange rate changes.
This paper takes on PTM using a unique data set that covers rm level trade at great detail
at monthly frequency. These high frequent data o¤er the opportunity of a new view on what
hides behind the time-aggregate estimates typically found using annual data. Annual trade
ows are the sum of multiple decisions taken at di¤erent points in time. By moving to monthly
trade ows we get closer to the transaction level where rm decisions are actually made. To
see the benet of that, note that annual data provide annual unit values  called prices in this
literature. By being annual data, these prices are averages over the di¤erent prices the rm has
charged during that year. With quantity rebates being a popular pricing strategy (for recent
evidence see e.g. Chu, Leslie & Sorensen, 2011), annual averages may indeed be far away from
actual prices. Using monthly data, and thus monthly unit values, we can be almost sure that
unit values are indeed close to the price specied in a particular export contract.
I nd that the utilization of monthly data does add new information about average PTM, and
the di¤erences between long-run PTM (LRPTM)2 and short-run PTM (SRPTM)3. Furthermore,
I nd industry di¤erences in terms of the magnitude and the timing of PTM, and that PTM
is stronger on high-income markets. As discussed in detail later on in the paper, these results
are in-line with theoretical predictions of choice of invoice currency and the associated pricing
mechanism.
My analysis is performed using the unique opportunity of matching the population of Danish
rms from the FIDA panel from Statistics Denmark with monthly rm-product-destination level
trade ows. I match the rm-level data with foreign exchange rate data from 27 non-euro
1The literature on exchange rate pass-through has been around for the past three decades. Goldberg & Knetter
(1997), Campa & Goldberg (2005), and Gopinath & Itskhoki (2010) represent important papers from each decade.
2Dened as the sum of exchange rate impact from 12 monthly lags.
3Dened as impact from a signicant single lag of the exchange rate.
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countries that make up about half of all Danish manufacturing exports. The data allows me to
estimate closely the link between high-frequency rm-level trade and the constantly changing
exchange rate.4 I estimate implied price elasticities to the exchange rate from a set of xed
e¤ects (within) regressions.
Following Berman, Martin & Mayer (2012) this paper starts by estimating export price
elasticities using annual data on Danish rms. These annual estimates are computed in order to
later on contrast the estimates using the more frequent monthly data. Using this annual data
I nd that Danish exporters on average adjust local currency export prices by 1.4% following a
10% currency change (i.e. PTM is 14%). Such an elasticity resembles the one found in the French
annual rm-product-destination-level data.5 But what exactly does this annual PTM measure
cover? Is it a time-averaged measure or a long-run e¤ect? Following Campa & Goldberg (2005),
I sort out the possible time-aggregation by comparing the annual estimates to di¤erent estimates
from the monthly data: specically LRPTM and SRPTM. I nd that overall LRPTM in the
manufacturing sector is 18%, thus evidence of higher PTM than the annual estimate suggest.
From the estimation equation for the LRPTM6, I restrict the estimation to as few lags possible
in search of a short-run estimate for PTM. At the aggregate level I nd that SRPTM prevails
in the very short run and on average the value coincides with the LRPTM estimate. However,
restricting the analyses to high-income destination markets points to higher SRPTM. Further
exploring SRPTM and LRPTM within industries demonstrates that PTM varies considerably
across industries in terms of magnitude and timing, and with large di¤erences between SRPTM
and LRPTM.
My results suggest that exporting rms respond to changes of exchange rates by swiftly
adjusting their prices as pricing-to-maket considerations imply. As time passes and more infor-
mation is available concerning competitorspricing and market reactions, rms will reduce their
initial adjustments, and thus the long-run response to exchange rate movements is lower than
initial, short-run responses. Clearly, annual data are not in position to uncover such a pattern
of responses. Having knowledge on how rms react to exchange rates changes both in the short
and the long run is important when assessing exchange rate regimes and their implications for
rm behaviour.
4 In contrast, Campa & Goldberg (2005) use an OECD country-level panel.
5Best comparable measure from Berman, Martin & Mayer (2012) is in the range of 9.7-12.4%
6 I follow the traditional denition (see Campa & Goldberg, 2005, and Gopinath & Itskhoki, 2010) as described
in detail later on
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The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses PTM and contributions to the PTM and
pass-through literature. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 presents the estimation methods.
Section 5 presents the results, and section 6 concludes.
2. Exchange Rates and Trade
While estimation of PTM focuses on export prices, many studies have focused on import prices
and to what extent they respond to exchange rate movements. This literature has documented
the presence of incomplete exchange rate pass-through, i.e. that import prices do not fully
adjust to exchange rate changes, and thus indirectly evidence of imperfect competition. The
discussion in this section will also briey concern exchange rate pass-through, because con-
tributions to this literature and the nding of incomplete pass-through can be conceived as
the mirror image of PTM. When discussing pricing to market I will refer to di¤erent elements
of pricing-to-market, specically short-run pricing-to-market (hereafter SRPTM) and long-run
pricing-to-market (hereafter LRPTM). In the pass-through literature we also nd an equivalent
terminology.
The literature on exchange pass-through is well-covered and goes well back in time. Goldberg
& Knetter (1997) document exchange rate pass-through on import prices of 60%.7 Recently in
the pass-through literature Gopinath & Itskhoki (2010) present and calibrate a model with price
rigidities. The results suggests that long-run pass-through on import prices is much lower (20%)
than the 60% Goldberg & Knetter (1997) suggested. Campa & Goldberg (2005) document
di¤erences in short-run and long-run exchange rate pass-though levels as well as di¤erences
across source countries. Though pass-through studies often o¤er great detail on the product
side, they are commonly macro level studies limited to explore industry and country variation,
and not rm-level based analyses.
The empirical literature on PTM from the perspective of the rm is vastly unexplored.
Berman, Martin & Mayer (2012) are the rst to explore the rm-level analysis of heterogeneous
PTM. They provide estimates using French rm-level data and document the heterogeneity
of export price elasticities with respect to exchange rate changes. They explain theoretically,
and they are able to document, heterogeneity in PTM on the basis of productivity di¤erences.
Extending Melitz & Ottaviano (2008) to include exchange rates they consider product markets to
7Estimates vary considerably (e.g. 20-25% in Gopinath, Itskhoki & Rigobon, 2007). Other papers include:
Knetter (1993), Lapham (1995), Feenstra et al (1996). Recent studies include Halpern & Koren (2007), Gopinath
& Rigobon (2008), Gopinath, Itskhoki & Rigobon (2007), and Gopinath & Itskhoki (2010).
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have decreasing price elasticities (a feature that e.g. linear demand satises)8. In this theoretical
setting, high-productivity rms have lower prices compared to low-productivity rms. They
therefore operate further down the demand curve and perceive demand elasticities for their
products to be lower. If an exporter is exposed to a depreciation of its currency, its price in
the foreign currency falls if the exporter does not react. This implies complete exchange rate
pass-through. If the exporter perceives demand elasticities for its products to be low, then it
can withhold some of the currency gain by increasing its price markup, thus increasing its home
currency price. This is an act of PTM and implies incomplete exchange rate pass-through.
If entering into exporting involves xed costs, we have endogenous selection into exporting,
implying that observed exporting rms in the data per se are more productive than non-exporters
(Melitz, 2003). Thus, from this selection story, we can expect that the average exporter exercises
PTM (i.e. we can expect to nd signicant implied export price elasticities to exchange rates)
because these exporters are fairly productive, otherwise they would not export. Moreover, if
rms do perceive product price elasticities to be low, and also to be lower for more productive
producers, we can expect above average PTM from the most productive exporters compared to
the rest of the exporters. Indeed, while Berman, Martin & Mayer (2012) nd evidence of PTM
for the average exporter, they also nd that less-than-average productive exporters engage less
in PTM and that highly productive exporters engage more in PTM.
Performing a similar estimation of average PTM on Danish data shows that evidence of
PTM exist among Danish Firms. So Danish rms that have succeeded in exporting, are to
some extent competitive and have some level of market power. They can lower product prices
less than one-to-one in response to exchange rate appreciations by not fully lowering export
prices, and they can raise export prices somewhat in response to exchange rate depreciations
and thereby not lower product prices one-to-one on the foreign market.
However, when we take theory to annual data and ultimately claim to test rm reactions,
we must state clearly what we are trying to reveal. Annual average of the exchange rate takes
out a great deal of variation. For example9, for the US dollar against the Danish krone in the
period 2004-2006 the three annual averages were within a range of 0.9% between the lowest and
the highest of the averages. So virtually no observations on pricing to market should be made.
8Berman, Martin & Mayer (2011) also argue that Atkeson & Burnstein (2008) and a "rm-heterogeneity"
extension Corsetti and Dedolas (2005) model with distribution costs can deliver such variable elasticities across
rms.
9See Appendix B for more examples.
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Figure 1: DKK per USD from JAN 2001 to DEC 2008
In this period, however, the monthly average uctuates from 6% below the period average to
14% above the period average. Thus, several observations of considerable magnitude are left
out in annual estimations compared to monthly, quarterly or even semi-annual data10. Thus,
estimation of PTM using annual data does surely not represent a measure of SRPTM. This will
also be clear from the results. PTM from annual data more resembles LRPTM, but at best we
can consider the annual measure a time-average PTM measure biased towards LRPTM.
Low short-run and high long-run pass-through rates (or equivalently high SRPTM and low
LRPTM) are documented empirically by Campa & Goldberg (2005) and theoretically by Drozd
& Nosal (2012). Drozd & Nosal suggest a model in which sluggish market expansion in the short-
run induces sellers to ght for market shares more ercely than in the more exible long-run
where the market expands.11
Campa & Goldberg (2005) using a OECD macro-panel of commodity trade conclude that in
the short-run the existence of partial pass-through rejects suggestions of both producer-currency-
pricing (implying complete pass-through) and local-currency-pricing (zero pass-through). The
choice of invoice currency is central in their argumentation. From a theoretical point of view they
rely on Devereux & Engel (2001) and Bacchetta & Wincoop (2005) who suggest that monetary
policy and exchange rate variability inuences choice of invoice currency. If the monetary policy
of a destination country is stable relative to the rms own currency, and exchange rate variability
is relatively low, then the invoice currency should be the one of your trading partner.12 This
10See table A2 in the appendix.
11Fighting for market shares is also implied by Atkeson & Bursteins (2008) cournot type model.
12 If country monetary policies are equally stable, one can also argue from a practical point of view that a rm
wants to ensure that its products are as easily accessible as possible. It is a burden barrier and a burden for
customers to translate foreign currency prices into their own currency and worry about risk.
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reasoning implies that we can expect to see that pass-through on high-income markets is low (or
equivalently PTM high) compared to mid- and lower-income markets, just because high-income
countries are traditionally more stable from a monetary point of view.
With this overview in mind, we have multiple suggestions as to why the distinction between
SRPTM and LRPTM is worth investigating, and why PTM is expected to be stronger on high-
income markets. To investigate these issues, I rely on detailed, high-frequent export data from
Denmark which are presented in the next section.
3. Data
I use the FIDA panel from Statistics Denmark. The data cover the universe of Danish rms
from 1996 to 2008 and close to 100% of Denmarks external trade. The analysis takes place at
the rm-product-destination-time level. I limit, however, the set of products per rm to only
cover the best selling product at each destination at each point in time.13 The panel consists
of manufacturing rms exporting to non-euro countries that have more than 10 million DKK in
export sales per year (about e1.4 million). The summary statistics of the annual and monthly
data sets are presented in table 1. The resulting panel has 2,567 rms, 6,407 products and
653,604 observations (rm-product-country-time) between OCT 2001 and MAR 2008. General
rm characteristics are annual but rm level external trade statistics are monthly. The trade
statistics are destination specic and include 8-digit CN product classication, value, and units.14
Thus, I compute unit values to proxy for free on board (FOB) export prices, as opposed to
import prices that include cost, insurance and freight (CIF). Clearly, using export prices is less
problematic than using import prices that contain elements that blur the pass-through picture
and thus demanding usage of di¤erent controls.
13 I have also computed a sample that only uses the rms single best selling product throughout the sample
period. Results are similar to those presented in the paper.
14CN is the Combined Nomenclature: The rst six diggits are consistent with HS6, the last two are free of
choice for the reporting country if the reporting country does not follow the European standard.
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Obs. Mean Median Std.dev
Annual data (2002-2007)
Full sample
Firms
# employees 1871 296 106 828
export share of revenue 7014 0,60 0,61 0,28
Exports
log unit values 68050 5,00 4,81 1,97
log value of exports 68050 13,11 13,24 2,49
High-income country sample
Firms
# employees 1854 261 98 747
export share of revenue 6925 0,60 0,61 0,27
Exports
log unit values 33040 4,94 4,74 1,92
log value of exports 33040 13,43 13,60 2,44
Monthly data (2001-2008)
Full sample
Firms
# employees 2567 335 102 971
export share of revenue 11470 0,63 0,65 0,27
Exports
log unit values 653604 5,05 4,86 2,02
log value of exports 653604 11,83 11,90 2,03
High-income country sample
Firms
# employees 2538 278 89 844
export share of revenue 11324 0,63 0,65 0,27
Exports
log unit values 355961 4,99 4,79 1,99
log value of exports 355961 11,95 12,02 1,99
Source: Statistics Denmark, own calculations
Table 1: Firm level data descriptives
The 27 countries included in the data set are listed in appendix B. Among these countries
are 14 major non-euro Danish export destinations15 (see Table 2). Denmark participates in the
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) with a central rate of DKK 746.038 per e100.
The system allows members to deviate by + 15%, however, Denmark follows an agreement with
the European Central Bank and the euro area members on a narrower uctuation band of
+
 2.25% (Danmarks Nationalbank). The analysis in this paper does not cover trade with the
euro area.16
About half of Danish exports in 2006 was manufacturing exports. Half of that export went
to non-euro destinations. Thus, non-euro exports made up about a quarter of Danish exports,
constituting a cornerstone of Danish exports. If exporters indeed do react considerably to
exchange rates, we have identied exchange rates as a likely source for short run aggregate
export volatility that is not related to product market shocks.
15Constituting 44% of manufacturing exports (Statistics Denmark, see table 2)
16See gure B4 in the appendix for graphical inspection of the DKK-EUR relationship.
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Country DKR EUR Share
Germany 45.851 6.163 16.6
Great Britain* 23.986 3.224 8.7
Sweden* 23.355 3.139 8.4
USA* 22.196 2.983 8.0
France 12.885 1.732 4.7
Norway* 12.378 1.664 4.5
Netherlands 10.516 1.413 3.8
Italy 9.811 1.319 3.5
Spain 7.683 1.033 2.8
Japan* 7.547 1.014 2.7
Poland* 5.688 765 2.1
Rusia* 5.376 723 1.9
Finland 4.713 634 1.7
China* 4.163 560 1.5
Belgium 3.849 517 1.4
Ireland 3.634 488 1.3
Czech Rep* 3.523 474 1.3
Australia* 3.109 418 1.1
Switzerland* 2.640 355 1.0
Greece 2.580 347 0.9
Canada* 2.424 326 0.9
Austria 2.335 314 0.8
Korea* 2.306 310 0.8
Hungary* 1.520 204 0.5
Turkey* 1.502 202 0.5
Total Danish manufacturing trade 276.667 37.186
Top 25 share of manufacturing trade 81.5
Non-euro share of manufacturing 46.12
Top 25 manufacturing share of total trade 50.87
Source: Statistics Denmark
Notes: In millions DKR and EUR. Non-euro countries are marked with a *
Table 2: Top 25 manufacturing export destinations
Compared to analyzing annualized data, this product detail at the monthly level brings
us very close to the transaction level decisions. Matching this with monthly uctuations in
exchange rates, clearly brings us closer to a mapping between foreign exchange rates and product-
destination-time specic pricing decisions.
Monthly foreign nominal exchange rates (NER) are from the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York. Real exchange rates (RER) are CPI-deated nominal rates. In the short run, uctuations
in the nominal exchange rate transfer to the real exchange rate. In the very short run (i.e.
month-to-month) one can assume for country c that "c = Ec Pc where Pc is the xed, relevant,
relative price index between Denmark and country c, and " is the real exchange rate. Thus
a shock to the nominal exchange rate E changes the real exchange rate one-to-one and thus
a¤ects the decisions of the rm in (almost) the same way. The assumption that the real and
the nominal exchange rates are highly correlated is consistent with empirical ndings (see e.g.
Kollman, 1997). In the results I primarily refer to estimations using the real exchange rate but
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I also show results from the nominal exchange rate.17
Appendix B contains graphs of selected exchange rates. To ease the graphical comparison
of exchange rates in appendix B, I clear unit di¤erences in exchange rates by computing the
demeaned exchange rate, fect; between DKK and each foreign currency of country c at time t asfect = ectec where ect is the average exchange rate in month t, and ec is the sample time average. I
also use this demeaned exchange rate in the estimations, but it has no impact on the analyses.
Exchange rates, ect, are denoted in foreign currency per Danish Krone. If ect increases by 10%,fect also increases by 10% constituting a 10% appreciation of the Danish Krone.
4. Estimation
I use two main estimation equations to estimate export price elasticities. Equation (1) is similar
to Berman, Martin & Mayer (2012) and I use it for estimations involving annual data as well as
monthly data:
lnUVijct = 0 +  ln gect l + t + ijc + "ijct (1)
The dependent variable lnUVijct is log of the unit value, an approximation for FOB export
prices. The explanatory exchange rate variable ln ]ec;t l includes a certain lag of the exchange rate
where l = f0; 1; ::; 12) indicates either the lag in years or months18 depending on the particular
estimation carried out. The resulting estimates of  are directly interpretable as implied price
elasticities with respect to the exchange rate. Exchange rates are commonly19 used as exogenous
variation in rm-level studies for many purposes other than PTM and exchange rate pass-
through, because exchange rate shocks are assumed to be orthogonal to other macroeconomic
shocks that hit rms.
I use pooled OLS with dummies to capture xed e¤ects, so the estimate of  is the dummy
variable estimator (i.e. a xed e¤ects within-regression). The variable indices are rm (i),
product (j), destination country (c), and time (t). I control for each year or month in the
sample (t) and add rm-product-destination xed e¤ect (ijc) to catch rm-specic e¤ects for
the individual rms destination-specic product market. Industry xed e¤ect are not included
17For simplicity I refer to the exchange rate in the remaining part of this section without distiguishing between
the nominal and the real exchange rate.
18Note that l = 0 in the estimations that use annual data because I use same-year-average exchange rate. In
the estimations that use monthly data, I always use minimum one month lagged exchange rate.
19See fx. Greenaway, Kneller & Zhang (2008), Verhoogen (2008), Hummels, Jorgensen, Munch & Xiang (2010,
on Danish annual rm-level data), and Brambilla, Lederman & Porto (2010)
77
as they introduce singularity.
From theory we know that an exporter practicing PTM will decrease its home currency
pricein order to stay competitive in a foreign marketfollowing an appreciation of its currency.
So we expect  < 0. If j  j< 1 the exporter will lower the price by less than one-to-one, implying
that the foreign importer will experience a rise, dpMt = dec;t l  (1  j  j), in the import price
measured in the foreign currency at time t. The rise in the import price will thus a be lower
percent increase than the the percent change in the exchange rate.
As discussed above, I wish to make the distinction between SRPTM and LRPTM. I can
make this distinction using short-run data like monthly data. SRPTM tells us when and by
how much an exporter changes its price in response to exchange rate uctuation in the short
run, while LRPTM tells us what the exporters general pricing strategy is in response to trend
movements of the exchange rate. I use a common denition of LRPTM20, dened as the sum
of the coe¢ cients of the lags across time. The estimation equation is similar to the long-run
exchange rate pass-through specication by Gopinath & Itskhoki (2010):21
lnUVijct = 0 +
12X
l=1
(l  ln ]ec;t l) + t + ijc + "ijct (2)
I use equation (2) in two di¤erent ways:
The rst way is for estimating LRPTM, which is calculated as the sum of the coe¢ cients
P12
l=1 l
for all 12 lags of the exchange rate. The second way is to estimate restricted versions by testing
the exclusion of both single and multiple lags from the LRPTM-estimates. This I do in search
of particular lagged responses for example within industries that may suggest di¤erences across
industries. Based on these restricted number of lags I then estimate SRPTM according to
equation 1.
5. Results
This section rst presents results from using the annual data to estimate average PTM in
subsection 5.1. These estimates compare with estimates from French rm level studies using
annual data and similar technique (Berman, Martin & Mayer, 2012). The estimates from the
annual Danish data then serve as reference estimates of the level PTM, that the literature has
20See e.g. Gopinath & Itskhoki (2010) and Campa & Goldberg (2005).
21While they trail back two years of monthly lags, I stick to one year in this paper. The reason is the comparison
with annual estimates.
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so far been able to o¤er. Subsection 5.2 then presents results using the monthly data. That
subsection will particularly highlight the information gained regarding di¤erences in SRPTM
and LRPTM.
5.1. Estimates of PTM Using Annual Data. Estimates by Berman, Martin & Mayer
(2012) on French rm level annual data suggest that average PTM is low, around 10-12%.
Column 1 in Table 3 presents average estimates of PTM using the Danish rm level annual
data. Whether we use nominal exchange rates or real exchange rates has little impact on the
estimate. The conclusion drawn is that using annual data, we nd a bit higher base estimates of
aggregate PTM on Danish rm level data compared to French data.22 Judging from these annual
estimates, Danish exporters lower export prices by 1.4% on average when facing an exchange
rate appreciation of 10%. Columns 2-4 show estimates split on top level industry categories
according to NACE classication Rev. 1.1. Clearly, the impression from these results is that the
aggregate estimate in column 1 is the result of considerable variation across industries. Multiple
explanations exists since rms in di¤erent industries face di¤erent challenges such as timing of
production and di¤erences in how to operate in the market,23 or level of competition (possibly
due to selection issues related to barriers of entering a market in the rst place). Concrete
examples will be discussed in section 5.2.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable
Nominal exchange rate (NER)
log(NER) -0,16 c -0,13 c -0,16 -0,19 c
(0,07) (0,06) (0,11) (0,09)
R2 0,97 0,98 0,96 0,97
No. observations 68050 8858 39273 19919
Real exchange rate (RER)
log(RER) -0,14 c -0,17 c -0,09 -0,21 a
(0,07) (0,07) (0,09) (0,05)
R2 0,97 0,98 0,96 0,97
No. observations 68050 8858 39273 19919
Sample (NACE industry category) all NACE = 1 NACE = 2 NACE = 3
log unit value
Notes:  Industry classification according to NACE Rev. 1.1. See table A.1 for details.
Significance levels are 1, 5, 10 per cent (a,b,c)
Source: Statistics Denmark, firm level external trade statistics, own calculations
Table 3: Pricing-to-market annual data
22Note that estimates using Danish data are only signicant at the 10 percent level. French estimates are more
signicant (see Berman, Martin & Mayer, 2012).
23For example o¤-the-shelf products such as socks compared to products produced after contracts are settled
such as new turbines for a factory.
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The extent of PTM also varies across markets. Singling out high-income destination markets,
we see that PTM is particularly strong on high-income destination markets (see table 4, columns
3 and 4) compared to the full sample of export markets (columns 1 and 2). In other words:
PTM on low-income markets pulls down average PTM estimates.24 That PTM is stronger on
high-income markets makes sense and is in-line with theories of more local-currency-pricing in
the stable monetary high-income economies (see e.g. Engel & Devereux, 2001, and Bacchetta &
Wincoop, 2005). On large and well-established markets25 the presence of more varieties implies
ercer competition, and thus a rm must adjust prices to stay in the market in response to
exchange rate movements (see Berman, Martin & Mayer, 2012, and Meltitz & Ottaviano, 2008).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable
log(exchange rate) -0,16 c -0,14 c -0,25 b -0,20 b
(0,07) (0,07) (0,07) (0,07)
R2 0,97 0,97 0,97 0,97
No. observations 68050 68050 33040 33040
Sample (markets) all all high income high income
Exchange rate used nominal real nominal real
Notes: Significance levels are 1, 5, 10 per cent (a,b,c).
log unit value
Source: Statistics Denmark, firm level external trade statistics, own calculations
Table 4: Pricing-to-market annual data
We now turn to the use of monthly data to see what we gain from using monthly data
compared to using annual data.
5.2. Estimates of PTM Using Monthly Data. The analysis of PTM using monthly data
will be disaggregated in the following four ways: First, the time dimension by going from annual
to monthly observations of rm level trade. Second, within-industry PTM estimates. Third,
separate high-income markets26 from the full sample. Fourth and nally, separate SRPTM from
LRPTM.
Because this paper stresses the comparison of PTM estimates from annual data and monthly
data, I use up to twelve monthly lags of the exchange rate to investigate whether this dynamic
approach adds valuable information compared to the annual, average exchange rate used to nd
24 In fact, for some low-income countries individually, PTM results are inconclusive.
25The term is used loosely here. This could be a large economy such as Great Britain or an advanced but
poorer economy like Korea, but it could also be a smaller economy with strong purchasing power, such as Norway,
Sweden or New Zeeland.
26See table A.1 in the appendix. 78% of full sample trade ows are preserved in the restricted sample of
high-income markets.
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annual estimates. This approach nds support in Campa & Goldberg (2005).27 Adding all
twelve coe¢ cients gives an estimate of LRPTM.28
Aggregate results and market type distinction. I start the analysis of the short-run
data by estimating industry-aggregate LRPTM for all markets and for high-income markets.
I then test the exclusion of all lags, but the rst, jointly. They are all accepted, and I then
estimate SRPTM based on the rst lag only.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable
log(exchange rate-1) -0,18 a -0,18 a -0,31 a -0,29 a
(0,02) (0,02) (0,02) (0,03)
LRPTM -0,17 -0,18 -0,28 -0,26
R2 0,91 0,91 0,92 0,92
No. observations 653604 653604 355961 355961
Sample (markets) all all high income high income
Exchange rate used nominal real nominal real
Source: Statistics Denmark, firm level external trade statistics, own calculations
log unit value
Notes: Significance levels are 1, 5, 10 per cent (a,b,c). LRPTM is the sum of the
coefficients of exchange rates in t-1, t-2,.., t-12, thus trailing back the cummulated
exchange rate response one year. All LRPTM-regressions pass joint significance tests
of the coeffecients.
Table 5: Long Run Pricing-to-market monthly data
Table 5 compares estimates of LRPTM and the rst, single, monthly lag using both the
nominal and the real exchange rate as explanatory variables. Not surprisingly at this level of fre-
quency, PTM estimates using the nominal exchange rate and the real exchange rate, respectively,
are similar. Focusing on the short-run estimate29 based on the real exchange rate suggests that
average PTM is higher than annual estimates suggest. Furthermore, at this industry-aggregate
level, the short-run and long-run estimates coincide for the whole sample. For high-income
markets a small di¤erence appears, however I cannot tell whether the di¤erence is signicant.
Comparing the overall estimates (columns 1 and 2) with the estimates from high-income
markets (columns 3 and 4) in table 5, we see that PTM is much stronger in high-income markets
with LRPTM at 26% or higher, and SRPTM at 29% and higher. This is consistent with Drozd &
Nosals (2012) reciprocal prediction of lower short-run than long-run pass-through onto import
27They add up to four lags of the exchange rate in their analysis that uses quarterly data.
28 I have also tried adding up to 24 for lags, just as Gopinath & Itskhoki (2010) do when determining Long-
Run-Pass-Through. This does not add value to the determination of LRPTM.
29By picking the rst lag as a result of exclusion testing.
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prices. Note also that the di¤erences in estimates between those from high-income markets are
higher when we use monthly data (26-29% for RER) compared to when we use annual data
(20% for RER).30
Dependent variable log unit value log unit value
Nace code NACE description LRPTM R2 # Obs. RER-lag R2 # obs. # firms # products
-0,19 a
(0,04)
-0,26 b
(0,12)
-0,11
(0,19)
-1,09 a
(0,34)
-0,59 a
(0,10)
-0,33 a
(0,10)
-0,26 c
(0,14)
-0,13
(0,14)
-0,03
(0,10)
-0,19 a
(0,06)
-0,44 c
(0,23)
-0,11
(0,10)
-1,12 b
(0,51)
-0,38 a
(0,09)
-0,35 c
(0,16)
-0,68 c
(0,34)
-0,14 b
(0,05)
PTM (based on selected sectors above)
Mean (weighted) -0,16 -0,27
Mean (unweighted) -0,22 -0,38
Median -0,17 -0,26
Source: Statistics Denmark, firm level external trade statistics, own calculations
Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.36
Manufacture of other transport equipment35
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers34
Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches
and clocks33
Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and
apparatus32
Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.31
Manufacture of office machinery and computers30
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.29
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and
equipment28
Manufacture of basic metals27
22
Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products21
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products26
25
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products24
1
1
3
1
5
Manufacture of food products and beverages15
4
1
Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media
139
181
65
59
1
93
1
1
61
39639 270
Manufacture of textiles17
54
1
-0,22
-0,05
-0,69
-0,06
-0,42
-0,57
0,04
0,09
-0,21
0,00
-0,17
-0,37
-0,13
-0,12
-0,16
-0,43
-0,22
0,92 1005
0,87 10958 0,87 12502
SRPTM
580
0,92 34740
0,88 4749 0,88 5160
0,90 7529 0,90 8461
0,96 20061 0,96 22889
0,88 29436 0,88 29824
0,96 6803 0,96 7828
0,92 6814 0,92 6898
0,86 32533 0,86 370502
0,77 100264 0,78 105734
0,75 4345 0,75 4784
11
0,85 18470 0,85 21407
4915
0,86 11114 0,86 10722
0,84 34003 0,84 38877
3
849
0,91 32210 0,91 36147
0,85 8012 0,85 9175
0,88 68
223
531
1
1
0,88 5020
272
187
279
567
29
142
786
805
442
407
364
1253
83
167
508
559
1938
257
828
491
Note: Industry classification according to NACE Rev. 1.1. Weighted mean PTM is based on number of observations. LRPTM is the sum of the coefficients of exchange rates in t-1, t-2,.., t-12, thus trailing
back the cummulated exchange rate response one year. All LRPTM-regressions pass joint significance tests of the coeffecients.
Table 6: Industry specic estimations of Pricing-to-market - using monthly data
Industry variation. So far I have shown that disaggregating the time-dimension of PTM
estimates delivers higher PTM estimates than estimations from annual data. Furthermore, we
also know that PTM is particularly pronounced on high-income markets.
I now decompose the estimates on two-digit NACE-level industries for high-income markets.
Table 6 presents the resulting estimates of LRPTM and prevailing lags after restriction tests31 as
a measure of the extent of SRPTM. Certain sectors have been left out of the table. Common for
these sectors is that the panel consists of either few rms, few observations, or both. The table
reads as follows: The left hand side columns contain results from estimation of LRPTM within
30See column 4 of tables 4 and 5, respectively.
31Every SRPTM estimation is di¤erent. Most contain a single lag, others contain a restricted set of lags where
one lag becomes signicant.
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each 2-digit nace industry code. The right hand side columns contain estimates of SRPTM.
RER-lag gives the signicant lag number (e.g. a "1" reads SRPTM prevails at the one month
lag, "11" at the 11 months lag, etc.). In the column to the right of RER-lag one nds the
associated value.
Three key points from table 6 are particularly interesting: First, SRPTM is higher than
LRPTM supporting the theoretical framework Drozd & Nosal (2012) and in-line with the em-
pirical results of Campa & Goldberg (2005)both discussed earlier. Second, rms in most sectors
respond to exchange rates in the very short run, but some react in the medium-/short-run (3-5
months) and in a single sector rms reacts well in advance of the shipping date and thus more
discretionary. Third and nal, PTM varies considerably across sectors - from zero to 69% in the
long run, and from zero to complete PTM in the short-run.32 These results in general suggest
that average PTM is low in the long-run, about (15-20%) but the variation across sectors is
quite wide. Of the estimations presented above, signicant ndings of industry level PTM cover
81% of all observations and 79% of all rms (implying that not all rms, but quite a signicant
share, price-to-market).
While average SRPTM is almost twice the size of LRPTM, the detailed picture is much
more varying. In the sector Manufacture of textiles (Nace code 17), LRPTM is very low, 5%,
but 1-month-SRPTM at 26% is seven times higher. This reects a sector in which short-term
settlements dominate conduct of business. In the sector Manufacture of radio, television and
communication equipment and apparatus (Nace code 32) rms are active in LRPTM and 3-
months-SRPTM. This indicates that rms settle contracts and payments with sellers at least
three months in advance of the shipment. Firms in the sector Manufacture of machinery and
equipment n.e.c. (Nace code 29) make price adjustments in response to the exchange rate well
ahead of shipment. Evidence of SRPTM is weak and coincides with LRPTM. This makes sense.
Firms in this sector produce heavy manufacturing equipment and production of such products
are often made on specic orders and possibly tailored for the individual need of the customer,
not on expected orders.
To sum up, the evidence from the estimations of PTM on the monthly rm level trade
data suggest that a more accurate PTM measure compared to an annual estimate enhances the
documentation of presence of PTM. Or equivalently: pass-through is lower than one can expect
when estimating pass-through rates from annual data. We cannot rule out neither producer-
32Highest value is 112% which is close to (actually more than) a one-one reaction to the exchange rate.
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currency-pricing (complete pass-through or zero PTM) nor local-currency-pricing (zero pass-
through or complete PTM) as Campa & Goldberg (2005). Estimates vary across industries and
these ndings open up for further research on timing of production, negotiation of contracts and
pricing strategies of rms in di¤erent industries.
6. Conclusion
Danish exporters price to market. Unlike other studies on pricing-to-market or exchange rate
pass-through, I disaggregate the time-aggregate estimates that one gets from using annual data
by making use of high-frequency rm-level export data. From this data I explore the hetero-
geneity across industries and market types as well as aspects of dynamic pricing-to-market.
The resulting price elasticities to the exchange rate are based on information on the numerous
short-run uctuations that are aggregated away in the annual estimates.
Estimates in this paper show that the short-run average pricing-to-market in the manu-
facturing sector is 18%. This compares with 14% using annual data. In-line with theoretical
predictions pricing-to-market is higher on high-income-markets: 22% in the long-run and 38%
in the short-run (un-weighted averages). Across industries pricing-to-market varies from zero to
unity, implying that both producer-currency-pricing and local-currency-pricing occur in specic
industries. Also in-line with theoretical predictions, Pricing-to-market is remarkably higher in
the short-run compared to the long-run, underlining the belief that sellers ght for market shares
in the short-run but in the longer run the market will expand and pricing strategies based on
exchange rate uctuations become less important.
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Appendix A: Descriptive tables
Countries High-income markets G7 (non-euro)
Australia x
Brazil
Canada x x
China
Czech Republic
Great Britain x x
Hong Kong x
India
Japan x x
Korea x
Malaysia
Mexico
New Zeeland x
Norway x
Poland
Rusia
Singapore x
Slovakia
South Africa
Sri Lanka
Sweden x
Switzerland x
Taiwan
Thailand
Turkey
USA x x
Venezuela
Source: World Bank
Note: High-income markets are defined as having minimum 50%
nominal GDP per capita relative to Denmark. Korea is also placed
here arbitrarily due to membership of the OECD and the size of the
economy. No non-high-income countries in the list are richer than
Korea in nominal per capita GDP terms.
Table A1: The 27 countries/economic regions in the sample
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Interval
1 month 3 5 16 29
3 months 1 3 4 5 9 11 15 20 27
6 months 1 3 8 10 14 15 18 25 27 29
Source: New York Federal Reserve, own calculations
Absolute percentage change of DKK-USD exchange rate
Table A2: Number of observed uctuations in the DKK-USD exchange rate in 2004-2006
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Appendix B: Graphical representation of exchange rates
All currencies in the graphs are in nominal exchange rates and are denoted in foreign currency
per DKK. They are expressed in terms of units relative to the sample time average (i.e. they
uctuate around 1 over the time span of the sample). Monthly exchange rates are averages of
daily averages. Annual rates are simple averages of monthly averages. Source: Federal Reserve
Bank of NewYork.
Figure C1: Great Britain Figure C2: Norway
Figure C3: United States Figure C4: The Euro
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Figure C5: Japan Figure C6: Poland
Figure C7: China Figure C8: Austalia
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Conclusion
This thesis examines behavioral responses related to international trade.
The rst chapter demonstrates the importance of modelling agents appropriately when es-
timating behavioral trade responses to tari¤ reforms. The second chapter utilizes worker-rm
panel data to estimate rm wage responses to new o¤shoring opportunities, and demonstrates
that rms act di¤erently depending on their experience with o¤shoring to a new destinantion.
The third chapter demonstrates that rms operating in di¤erent markets price very di¤erently
in response to exchange rate uctuations, both in relation to magnitude of response and to the
timing.
The rst chapter highlight a general discussion on developing countries and exemplies it
through the use of Vietnam. Developing countries, especially socialist oriented developing coun-
tries, highly rely on state production. Indeed, Vietnam relies heavily on state industrial pro-
duction. Such a predominant position of state-owned enterprises needs special consideration
or otherwise mistaken policy conclusions can be made. The policy that this paper considers is
the trade liberalization scheme that WTO has imposed on Vietnam upon its accession into the
WTO in 2007. Tari¤s have to fall in a pre-dened way by 2014. As we show, the ultimate gains
from trade liberalization on economic development in Vietnam will be greatly at stake due to
the distortions created by the strong presence of state-owned enterprises.
The WTO accession-led tari¤ reform does not take all this into account. Tari¤s on state-
owned produced goods fall, but not a lot  other sectorstari¤s fall even more. As a result,
the WTO accession tari¤ cuts will worsen the situation for Vietnam with the state-owned sector
expanding even more. There are also distributional consequences to be aware of. Our results
show that the aggregate welfare loss will hit mostly the lower-income rural population. These are
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the people that work in the sensitive labour-intensive primary sector. As generally recognized,
this rural population is the prime source of poverty in developing countries, so the fact that the
welfare losses are primarily within the lower end of the income scale demands special attention.
Policy makers must recognize that state-owned produced goods have to undergo relatively
larger trade liberalization than competitively produced goods to secure the gains from trade.
Therefore, not even other traditional tari¤ reforms (such as proportional tari¤ cuts and con-
certina cuts) will work in this setting. Such reforms will fail to reduce su¢ ciently the protection
of the state-owned sector and thus bound to fail. Indeed, our calculations show that this is
clearly the case.
Inspired by the basic principle behind the concertina tari¤ cut reform, viz. that we should
reduce the highest distortion, we suggest a tari¤ reform that targets the highest distortion in
the present model. We reduce the tari¤ of the state-owned enterprises leaving the other tari¤s
unchanged. To show the potential that such a reform can have, we search for the tari¤ level
that will maximize the potential welfare gains. It turns out that the imports of the state-owned
produced good should be subsidized by 32%: In that case, both the aggregate welfare and the
welfare of the low income rural population will rise considerably.
Clearly, if Vietnam was able to complete within the accession period a reform of state-owned
enterprises so that they become competitive, the WTO accession schedule of nal rates, as all
other conventional tari¤ reforms, will yield aggregate welfare gains. However, such a complete
restructuring of the state-owned enterprises is far from what is going on in reality.
The second chapter uses rich linked worker-rm data from Denmark to address how o¤shoring
a¤ects rm level average wage. The chapter uses Chinas accession to the WTO in December
2001 and the boom in Chinese exports soon after, as an exogenous shock to the incentive
to o¤shore to China by Danish rms. This shock allows identication of the causal e¤ect of
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o¤shoring on wages.
Unlike other papers in this literature, the chapter considers di¤erent possible channels
namely skill composition and rent sharing e¤ects to explain o¤shoring induced gains in rm
average wages. A skill composition e¤ect increases average wage if rms send low-skilled jobs
abroad retaining high skilled workers at home who require higher pay. A rent sharing e¤ect
increases average wage if rms share o¤shoring induced increase in prots with all existing
worker. The ndings show that rms sourcing from China in 2002 had higher increase in average
wages between 2002 and 2005 compared to the control group. While the presence of the skill
composition e¤ects does underline that Danish rms o¤shore certain jobs, the presence of the
rent sharing e¤ect highlights that rms o¤shoring to China also enjoy increased protability and
share that with employees. The important result to highlight here is that the timing of when
a rm is exposed to a shock to the incentive to o¤shore matters. In our case: Firms present in
China before Chinas accession to the WTO in December 2001 o¤shored jobs using relatively
unskilled labor. Whereas, rms not present in China before the time of accession increased
protability and shared these increases with their employees, thus pointing to increased welfare.
These rms however did not o¤shore relatively more any particular skill type of job. One possible
explanation for this could be the size di¤erence of the two types of rms and hence their workforce
composition. Smaller manufacturing rms (less than thirty employees) are likely to have more
homogeneous workforce and for them the average skill level of the workers might not change
much over the years. Bigger rms already o¤shoring to China are likely to have more diverse
workforce and hence for them both composition and rent sharing matter for the wage increase.
However, the skill composition e¤ect signicantly explains about half that gain while the other
half explained by the rent sharing e¤ect is not statistically signicant.
Though estimations are carried out at the rm level, the estimations fully utilize the worker-
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rm matched data. Following Frias, Kaplan & Verhoogen (2012) e¤ects on average wages are
decomposed into estimated e¤ects due to skill composition changes and changes due to rent
sharing. These results are compared with results obtained using measures of skill composition
and rent sharing available from typical rm level data. The chapter shows that using linked
worker-rm data adds insight behind the wage increase mechanism because, in this case, the two
sets of results do not conform; ratio of educated to uneducated workers as a traditional measure
for skill composition and sales per employee as a measure of rent sharing cannot explain the
average wage increase. Our measure of composition and rent sharing constructed from the
worker level wage regression of the AKM type do.
The third chapter demonstrates that Danish exporters price to market. Unlike other studies
on pricing-to-market or exchange rate pass-through, this study disaggregates the time-aggregate
estimates that one gets from using annual data by making use of high-frequency rm-level export
data. From this data the study explores the heterogeneity across industries and market types
as well as aspects of dynamic pricing-to-market. The resulting price elasticities to the exchange
rate are based on information on the numerous short-run uctuations that are aggregated away
in the annual estimates.
Estimates in this paper show that the short-run average pricing-to-market in the manu-
facturing sector is 18%. This compares with 14% using annual data. In-line with theoretical
predictions pricing-to-market is higher on high-income-markets: 22% in the long-run and 38%
in the short-run (un-weighted averages). Across industries pricing-to-market varies from zero to
unity, implying that both producer-currency-pricing and local-currency-pricing occur in specic
industries. Also in-line with theoretical predictions, Pricing-to-market is remarkably higher in
the short-run compared to the long-run, underlining the belief that sellers ght for market shares
in the short-run but in the longer run the market will expand and pricing strategies based on
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exchange rate uctuations become less important.
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